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EXCULPATION AS INCULPATION
Russell L. Christopher*
ABSTRACT

Should a criminal defendant who contrives, creates, or causes the
conditions of her own defense forfeit the defense? For example, suppose a
provocateur taunts a provocatee into unlawfully attacking so that the
provocateur may justifiably kill in self-defense. There are two competing
approaches. Under the principle that defense-contrivers have "unclean
hands," the predominantapproach of the criminal law is to bar the defense
(the Legal approach). Disagreeing,most criminal theorists advocate both
granting the contrived defense and, seemingly paradoxically, imposing
criminal liability for culpably contriving the defense (the Theoretical
approach). That is, seeking exculpation is itself inculpatory.The Theoretical
approach raises the following puzzle: how does coupling the intent to act
lawfully 6ustifiably) with an independently lawful act (taunting) that causes
a lawful (ustified) result combine to create criminal liability? By
appreciating the conditional nature of defense-contrivers' strategy and
applying the overlooked doctrine of conditionalintent, this Article solves the
puzzle but demonstrates that the Theoreticalapproach simply does not work.
It fails to hold defense-contrivers liable for a wide variety of offenses. In
contrast, the comparatively straightforward Legal approach-barring
contrived defenses-avoids these failures, successfully imposes liability, and
is thereforepreferable.
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INTRODUCTION

Should an actor who contrives, creates, or causes the conditions of her
own defense to criminal liability receive the benefit of the defense? Consider
the following examples: intentionally becoming intoxicated in order to
commit a previously planned crime while in a state of irresponsibility;
intentionally joining a criminal gang in order to be coerced into committing
a previously planned crime under duress; intentionally starving oneself so as
to steal food under conditions of necessity. Consider also some problematic,
borderline examples: inviting attack by intentionally dressing provocatively
and walking through a dangerous part of town late at night and then killing
in self-defense; intentionally conceiving a child in order to be able to
recklessly speed one's wife to the hospital some nine months later.' Our
formal intuition suggests that defendants satisfying the legal requirements of
a defense should receive it. But our deeper intuition senses something is

1.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) cmt. 5, at 20 n.27 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft &
Revised Comments 1985).
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amiss: rather than intentionally making defense conditions happen by us,
defense conditions should happen to us.
The criminal law largely embraces this deeper intuition. While
encouraging us to avoid satisfying the elements of offenses, the criminal law
suspiciously eyes those seeking to satisfy the requirements for defenses. 2 To
avoid liability through defenses, defendants must have "clean hands," 3 or be
without fault;4 defense-contrivers have "dirty hands."5 The contrived-defense
doctrine enjoys nearly universal support both in the law 6 and among criminal
theorists' and applies to nearly all defenses. 8 Yet there is extensive
disagreement as to the preferable approach to and theoretical foundations of
the doctrine.'

2.
See Susan Dimock, Actio Libera in Causa, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 549, 557 (2013) ("[W]hen
one has culpably caused the conditions of an affirmative defence in order to (or knowing or
suspecting that one will or might) commit an offence, the usual inference to lack of culpability on
the basis of the defence is defeated.").
3.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 289 (6th ed. 2012).
4.
David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy,90 MICH. L. REV.
2348, 2387 (1992) ("The critical inquiry is whether, in acting in a way that creates an excuse, the
individual is at fault for the offense excused.").
5.
See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion's Puzzle, 90 IowA L. REV. 1677, 1709 10 (2005)
("[Defense-contrivers] are in some fashion responsible for getting themselves into trouble. They
all have 'dirty hands,' as a result of which the law denies them a defense to which they would
otherwise have been entitled.").
6.
See Marc 0. DeGirolami, Culpability in Creating the Choice of Evils, 60 ALA. L. REV.
597, 598 (2009) ("Can an actor justify criminal conduct when he was criminally culpable in
creating the conditions making it necessary? Virtually every American jurisdiction answers that
he cannot."); see also sources cited infra note 10.
7.
LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 43 (1987) ("Everyone's intuition seems to be
that the blameworthy [contriving] defendant forfeits his right to [escape liability]."); DeGirolami,
supra note 6, at 614 (acknowledging "the universal intuition" that culpable defense- contriving
should result in liability).
8.
E.g., Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the
Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1985) ("[T]he existence of
statutory provisions that consider [the contrived defense doctrine] to some degree for a wide
variety of defenses [including] . .. insanity ... hypnosis ... duress ... lesser evils ... selfdefense ... defense of others ... [and] defense of property." (footnotes omitted)).
9.
Compare Larry Alexander, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense, 7 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 623, 623 (2013) ("There are no theoretical problems that attach to one's causing the
conditions that permit him to claim a defense to some otherwise criminal act."), with Garvey,
supra note 5, at 1709 ("Such forfeiture [of contrived defenses] rules are well-known, though not
uncontroversial, features of the criminal law.").

1144

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Most criminal theorists maintain that holding defense-contrivers
criminally liable by barring their defense (the Legal approach) 10 is wrong."
As Paul Robinson argues, "current law ... is inadequate[,] ... inconsistent,
frequently irrational, and it is a poor approximation of our collective sense of
justice."' 2 Following Robinson, most theorists advocate granting the defense
but nonetheless imposing criminal liability for contriving the defense (the
Theoretical approach). 3 While the Legal approach embodies only one of our
conflicting intuitions about contrived defenses, the Theoretical approach
captures both-contrived defenses both exculpate and inculpate. In a sense,
the Theoretical approach mirrors the "have one's cake and eat it too" strategy
of defense-contrivers. Just as defense-contrivers craftily scheme to commit a
crime yet escape liability, the Theoretical approach ingeniously exculpates
the crime for which there is a contrived defense but inculpates the very
contriving of the defense. That is, the very seeking of exculpation is itself
inculpatory.
Regardless of which approach best captures our intuitions, enjoys
conceptual advantages, or reflects sounder policy, this Article argues that the
Theoretical approach simply does not work. It fails to hold defense-contrivers
criminally liable for a wide variety of offenses. In contrast, the simple and
straightforward Legal approach-barring contrived defenses-works and is
preferable.
To illustrate the differing approaches, 14 suppose Able intends to kill Baker
if and only if doing so constitutes justified self-defense. With that intent, Able
10. See Donald A. Dripps, FundamentalRetribution Error:CriminalJustice and the Social
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1413 (2003) ("Generally speaking, current law
holds this [defense-contriving] against the accused, typically by prohibiting the defendant from
raising the defense at all if he was at fault ... in creating the excusing or justifying condition.");
accordClaire Finkelstein & Leo Katz, Contrived Defenses and DeterrentThreats: Two Facets of
One Problem, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 479, 482 83 (2008) (noting that American law generally
denies the contrived defense).
11. See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 599 (noting the disagreement between the law's
approach of barring the defense and most scholars who favor granting the defense).
12. Robinson, supra note 8, at 2.
13. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW § 8.0.3, at 293 (2d ed.
2012) ("An alternative approach to those taken in current law is to allow a defense for the
immediate conduct constituting the offense, but to impose liability for the actor's earlier conduct
in causing the defense conditions."); DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 599 ("Scholars generally follow
Robinson's view that [defense-contriving] should almost never bar the defense."); Stephen P.
Garvey, What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter, 85 TEX. L. REV. 333, 354 n.72 (2006)
(referring to Robinson's view as the "classic discussion" of defense-contriving).
14. The labels of the Legal and Theoretical approaches are helpful for the purpose of clarity
in drawing a sharp contrast but are somewhat misleading. Not all jurisdictions bar contrived
defenses. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 13, § 8.0.3, at 288 89 ("Under one approach to
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taunts Baker to induce Baker to attack unlawfully. Enraged, Baker attempts
to kill Able. Able kills Baker. The Legal approach bars Able's contrived selfdefense. 5 But criminal theorists argue that because Baker's aggression is
unlawful, Able justifiably killed in self-defense. 6 Despite granting Able's
contrived defense, the Theoretical approach holds Able criminally liable for
murder for culpably contriving the defense.17 Seemingly paradoxically, the
Theoretical approach both provides a defense to and holds the contriver
criminally liable for one and the same murder. 8
To partially defang this conceptual oddity of the Theoretical approach, it
is helpful to highlight two distinct temporal stages. 9 Following a convention
in the literature, let's distinguish the contriver's earlier conduct, at time TI,
from his later conduct, at T2. 2° At TI, Able commits the voluntary act of
taunting with the intent of (later) shooting and killing Baker at T2. The
Theoretical approach claims that the taunting at TI, not the shooting at T2,
causes Baker's death. 21 Therefore, at TI, Able satisfies the elements of the

current law, a defense remains available even though the actor was culpable in bringing about its
conditions."). Similarly, not all criminal theorists advocate granting contrived defenses. See infra
text accompanying notes 115 17.
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (AM. LAw INST. 1985) ("The use of deadly
force is not justifiable if: (i) the actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm,
provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter.").
16. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 626 (finding provocatees to be "murderous culpable
aggressors" against whom their provocateurs enjoy a right of self-defense); Robinson, supranote
8, at 5 n. 14 ("It is hard to understand why the provoker should lose the right of self-defense when
he is not culpable and when his conduct is too trivial to give rise to a right of self-defense for the
person whom he provokes.").
17. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Entrapment Through the Lens of the Actio Libera in Causa, 7 CRIM.
L. & PHIL. 587, 589 91 (2013) (noting the "reigning" theoretical approach both grants the
provocateur's defense to and holds the provocateur liable for murder); Robinson, supra note 8, at
27 (advocating allowing "the actor a defense for the immediate conduct constituting the offense,
but... impos[ing] liability on the basis of the actor's earlier conduct in culpably causing the
conditions of his defense").
18. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Provocateurs, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 597, 603 (2013)
("[W]ith respect to provocateurs, it seems rather odd to say that purposeful engagement in conduct
at T1 renders one criminally culpable for murder because a dead body is caused at T2, but one is
justified for the act of killing at T2.").
19. Katz, supra note 17, at 589 ("There are two pivotal points in time to consider here.").
20. See Ferzan, supra note 18, at 598 99 (dividing defense-contrivers' conduct into two
phases, the early phase and the later phase, as demarcated by T1 and T2); Douglas Husak,
Intoxication and Culpability, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 363, 364 65 (2012) (same).
21. See Katz, supra note 17, at 593 ("The reigning [theoretical] approach ... impose[s]
liability on the defendant on the ground that he caused the victim's death ... [at] the time at which
the provocation began."); Robinson, supra note 8, at 31 ("Where the actor is not only culpable as
to causing the defense conditions, but also has a culpable state of mind as to causing himself to
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offense of murder-intentionally causing the death of another.2 2 At T2,
Able's use of lethal force against Baker's unlawful aggression constitutes
justified self-defense. 23 Able's T2 defense is unavailable, however, for the
murder liability at TI because Baker was not then unlawfully aggressing
24
against Able.
The key conceptual move of the Theoretical approach is the temporal
division of the contriver's conduct into two separate and independent stages.2 5
This allows the Theoretical approach to have its cake and eat it too. It can
both grant the contrived defense at the later stage and impose criminal
liability at the earlier, defense-contriving stage. Because each stage is
separate and independent, the assessment of neither stage impacts the other.
Inculpation at the early stage does not preclude exculpation at the later stage
which, in turn, does not preclude inculpation at the early stage.
If the outcome is generally the same under either approach-the defensecontriver (Able) is held liable (for murder)-what is their practical
difference? While the Theoretical approach touts numerous practical and
27
theoretical advantages 2 6 the principal difference for justification defenses
is a clearer allocation of the rights of third parties to intervene in defense of
one of the parties. Justified conduct (as opposed to excused conduct) is
permissible, perhaps even beneficial, lawful conduct. 28 Third parties may
lawfully aid, but not hinder, justified conduct.2 9 Under the Legal approach in
engage in the conduct constitutingthe offense, the state should punish him for causing the ultimate
justified or excused conduct.").
22. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2017) ("A person is guilty of murder in
the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person .....
23. See supra notes 16 17.
24. See Claire Finkelstein, Involuntary Crimes, Voluntarily Committed, in CRIMINAL LAW
THEORY 143, 157 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) (noting that contrived defenses are
unavailable for the earlier, defense-contriving conduct).
25. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 9, at 623 ("If one assesses the culpability of an actor at
each of the various times he acts in a course of conduct, then ... a nonculpable act at T2 has no
bearing on whether an actor was culpable at T1 when he caused the circumstances that are
exculpatory with respect to his act (or conduct) at T2.").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 99 103.
27. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 16.03, at 204 ("Justified conduct... is a good thing, or
the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do. That is, a justified act is an act that is right
or, at least, not wrong."); GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) ("A
justification speaks to the rightness of an act; an excuse, to [lack of responsibility] for a
concededly wrongful act.").
28. See sources cited supra note 27; sources cited infra note 242.
29. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 17.05, at 219 ("[I]f D is justified in performing act A to
protect her own rights, a third person, X is also justified in doing A to protect D."); Kent
Greenawalt, The PerplexingBorders ofJustificationand Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900
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which both Able and Baker are unjustified, it is unclear on whose side a third
party could permissibly intervene-perhaps neither." But under the
Theoretical approach in which Able is justified and Baker is unjustified, a
third party could permissibly use force only on behalf of Able against Baker."
The preferable allocation of third-party intervention rights raises significant
ramifications for several recent high-profile self-defense cases, including the
controversial George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin case, that have
2
contributed to a renewed focus on defense-contriving.
Though enjoying greater precision in allocating the rights of third parties,
the Theoretical approach may be unsound. The few scholars not endorsing
the Theoretical approach focus their criticism particularly on its application
to justification defenses. 3 Given that contrivers of justification defenses
engage in justified, "wholly legal conduct," Claire Finkelstein skeptically
questions their criminal liability. 4 Leo Katz suggests that such contrivers'
intent to act justifiably (and thus lawfully) fails to constitute a sufficiently
culpable mens rea.3 5 To illustrate Katz's point, Able does not merely have the
intent to kill Baker. Rather, Able has the intent to kill Baker lawfully-in
justified self-defense. Building on Finkelstein and Katz's insights gives rise
to a significant puzzle for the Theoretical approach: how does coupling the
intent to act lawfully with an independently lawful act (taunting) that causes
(1984)

("Justified ... actions should not be interfered with ...

and such actions may be

assisted.").
30. See Ferzan, supra note 18, at 602 ("Why think that third parties ought to intervene when
both sides are in the wrong?").
31. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 626 (arguing that third parties may justifiably aid only
provocateurs against provocatees' unjustified attacks); Robinson, supra note 8, at 27 ("Where
conduct is justified because it avoids a net harm for society, it provides little basis on which to
fasten blame and it is against society's interest to deter it .... [S]ociety wants any and all persons
[to aid justified conduct] ....

To withdraw a defense for such conduct is to punish and to

discourage it.").
32. See Joshua D. Brooks, Note, Deadly-ForceSelf-Defense and the Problem of the Silent
Subtle Provocateur, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 536 (2015) (speculating whether
Zimmerman contrived self-defense in his shooting of Martin); John D. Moore, Note, Reasonable
Provocation:Distinguishingthe Vigilantfrom the Vigilante in Self-Defense Law, 78 BROOK. L.
REV. 1659, 1680 81, 1692 95 (2013) (discussing notable self-defense cases, including
Zimmerman's, as involving intentional provocation). For renewed theoretical interest in defensecontriving, see generally Dimock, supra note 2, at 549 (collecting essays from a conference
devoted to defense-contriving).
33. See, e.g., DeGirolami, supranote 6, at 601 (arguing that contrivers of necessity defenses
should forfeit the defense); Ferzan, supra note 18, at 616 (contending that provocateurs should
generally be ineligible for self-defense).
34. Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 160.
35. See Katz, supra note 17, at 593 ("[H]aving the intention of killing someone in selfdefense is arguably a perfectly innocent intention .... ).

1148

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

a lawful result (the justified killing of an unlawful aggressor) combine to
create criminal liability for murder? Stated another way, why does the intent
to use lawful force make the use of that lawful force unlawful? The puzzle
only deepens upon considering that absent the intent to act lawfully there is
no criminal liability whatsoever. 6 The Theoretical approach incurs this
puzzle by allowing the contrived defense; the Legal approach avoids this
puzzle by disallowing the defense."
This Article solves the puzzle, as well as others generated by the
Theoretical approach,3 8 by appreciating the conditional nature of contrivers'
plans and applying the overlooked doctrine of conditional intent. 9 For
example, Able does not simply intend to kill; he has a conditional intent. Able
conditions his intent to kill on being able to do so justifiably and thus
lawfully. Under the Model Penal Code's influential formulation, conditional
intent suffices as actual intent "unless the condition negatives the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense."4 Other formulations
similarly establish that placing a lawful condition on an actor's intent
precludes actual intent.4 1 By conditioning his intent to kill on killing only
justifiably, Able places a lawful condition on his intent thereby negating the
harm and evil of his offense of murder. Therefore, Able's conditional intent
fails to suffice as actual intent. 42 Lacking the requisite intent, Able is not
criminally liable for intentional murder. As a result, the conditional intent
doctrine solves the puzzle: the intent to act lawfully, coupled with a lawful
36. Cf Joachim Herrmann, Causing the Conditions of One's Defense: The Multifaceted
Approach of German Law, 1986 BYU L. REv. 747, 751 ("[T]he act justified by self-defense
cannot become illegal only because the actor had it in mind when he provoked the attack of the
other party.").
37. Under the Legal approach, the contriver intends to act in a way that law will regard, by
barring the defense, as unlawful. Criminal liability resulting from coupling the intent to act in a
way that is unlawful with conduct that is independently lawful but that causes an unlawful result
is not puzzling.
38. See infra Part III.B.
39. See, e.g., Kenneth Campbell, Conditional Intention, 2 LEGAL STUD. 77, 77 (1982)
(conceptualizing conditional intent as the intent to perform an act "only if some contingency
occurred"); Gideon Yaffe, ConditionalIntent and Mens Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY 273, 273 (2004)
(formalizing conditional intention as "'I intend to A if X.' where A represents some act and X
represents the condition). For the Supreme Court's interpretation of conditional intent, see
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 4 (1999).
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. Cf R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 56 (1990) ("[A] landlord
might have had the conditional intention to demolish her building if she could obtain the
appropriate licenses; but before she obtained the licenses she could not be said to intend, though
she might hope, to demolish the building.").
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act that causes a lawful result, appropriately results in no criminal liability for
intentional murder.
Yet this solution to the puzzle exposes a fatal flaw. The crux of the
Theoretical approach is that the defense granted to the contriver's later
conduct is inapplicable to her earlier culpable conduct of contriving the
defense.43 But the doctrine of conditional intent makes the defense relevant
to the earlier conduct as well. Understanding the contriver's intent as
conditional necessarily bridges the two separate temporal stages. Rather than
the contriver merely having intent at TI, the contriver has intent at TI
conditioned on a future event at T2.44 Because the nature of the condition
determines whether conditional intent suffices as actual intent,4 5 the defense
at T2 may preclude the contriver's conditional intent from sufficing as actual
intent at T 1. When the defense is a justification defense, the contriver has a
conditional intent to act justifiably and thus lawfully. Conditioning one's
intent on acting lawfully negates the harm and evil the offense seeks to
prevent and thus precludes conditional intent from sufficing as actual intent.4 6
Returning to our example, Able's lack of the requisite mens rea of intent at
TI forecloses Able's liability for intentional murder at TI. Granting
justification defenses to contrivers at the later stage precludes the Theoretical
approach from holding them liable for the earlier stage. In contrast, by barring
contrived defenses, contrivers' conditional intent suffices as actual intent,
allowing the Legal approach to hold contrivers liable.
This Article demonstrates that conditional intent is a powerful analytical
tool with which to assess contrived defenses. While the conditional intent
doctrine solves the troubling puzzle of the Theoretical approach, it also
precludes the Theoretical approach from holding contrivers of justification
defenses liable. Even apart from the doctrine, merely the conditional nature
of defense-contrivers' plans precludes the Theoretical approach from holding
contrivers of any type of defense liable for some types of offenses. To the
extent that defense-contrivers should be held liable-a nearly universal
intuition and one embraced by both approaches-this Article argues that the
Legal approach is correct and the Theoretical approach incorrect.
43. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 623 ("[A] nonculpable act at T2 has no bearing on
whether an actor was culpable at TI .... ); Robinson, supra note 8, at 31 n. 115 (providing an
example of how a nonculpable act at T2 does not factor into an analysis of whether the actor was
culpable at T1).
44. See Case Comment, CriminalLaw Conditional Intent as Satisfying Specific Intent
Requirementfor Aggravated Assault, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 479, 479 ("A conditional intention is
the intention that one's conduct will be governed by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a future
event." (emphasis added)).
45. See infra Part II.B C.
46. See infra Part II.B C.
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This Article unfolds in the following parts. The first two Parts supply
overviews of the contrived defense and conditional intent doctrines. Part I
explains the Legal and Theoretical approaches to contrived defenses,
discusses the debate over whether to allow or disallow contrived defenses,
and canvasses criticisms of the Theoretical approach. After explicating the
conditional nature of defense-contriving, Part II presents the Model Penal
Code's influential formulation of the conditional intent doctrine and sorts
courts' application of non-Model Penal Code formulations into three groups.
Under all four formulations, conditional intent fails to constitute actual intent
where the condition is based on entirely lawful conduct.
Part III applies conditional intent to contrived defenses. After explaining
conditional intent's relevance, it presents and solves a number of troublesome
puzzles incurred by the Theoretical approach. Part III next demonstrates that
for an entire class of defense-justification-the Theoretical approach fails
to hold contrivers criminally liable for offenses requiring the mens rea of
purpose, intention, or knowledge. Additionally, the Theoretical approach
fails to hold contrivers of excuse defenses liable for offenses requiring the
mens rea of knowledge. Finally, Part III anticipates, presents, and rebuts two
possible objections. The Article concludes that because the Theoretical
approach fails to hold contrivers of both justification and excuse defenses
liable for a wide variety of offenses, the Legal approach is preferable.

I.

CONTRIVED DEFENSES

This Part presents the two contrasting approaches to the contrived-defense
doctrine. It illustrates the Legal approach through the justification defenses
of self-defense and necessity as well as the excuse defense of duress. This
Part next explicates the Theoretical approach that, like the Legal approach,
holds the defense-contriver criminally liable, but, unlike the Legal approach,
allows the contrived defense. After exploring the principal advantages of
each approach, it canvasses criticisms of the Theoretical approach's inability
to establish various requisite elements of criminal liability.
A. Legal Approach-Barthe Defense
Most jurisdictions generally bar contrived defenses and hold contrivers
criminally liable.4 But the issue is not treated systematically by reference to

47.

See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text.
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a single principle.48 Rather, differing standards as to what type of conduct
forfeits a defense apply across different jurisdictions and for different
defenses.4 9 Even within the same jurisdiction, different standards apply to
different defenses." Despite these variations, the predominant Legal
approach holds contrivers liable by barring their defense.5'
The issue of defense-contriving is perhaps most prominent regarding selfdefense.52 The overarching principle is that self-defense is unavailable unless

48. Robinson and Cahill explain the law's lack of a systematic treatment of contrived
defenses:
Most of the important issues in defenses are specific to a single defense or type
of defense .... However, one issue the problem of an actor who causes the
conditions of his or her own defense transcends the defense groupings.
Theoretically, the issue can arise with regard to any defense. Current doctrine
takes different approaches to the problem in different contexts, even though
the problem is conceptually analogous in each.
ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 13, § 8.0.3, at 288.

49. Robinson identifies four different approaches to the issue in legal doctrine. Robinson,
supra note 8, at 3 26. First, deny a defense if the contriver makes any causal contribution to the
circumstances of the defense arising. Id. at 3 8. Second, deny a defense based on some minimum
culpable causal contribution; the actor must be at fault. Id. at 8 13. Third, deny the full
exculpatory effect of the defense and allow for a reduced level of liability. Id. at 14 17. Fourth,
deny the defense and impose liability based on the degree of culpability in causing the defense
conditions. Id. at 17 20.
50. See id. at 20 23 (explaining that the Model Penal Code takes five different approaches
to five different defenses).
51. See supra notes 6, 10, 49 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For an example of a self-defense provision,
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) ("[T]he use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for
the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the
present occasion.").
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one is "free from fault."5 3 What constitutes fault is not so readily articulated. 4
Clearly, an actor loses the right of self-defense if she is the initial aggressor. 5
One becomes an initial aggressor by committing unlawful acts or uttering
unlawful threats intended to cause a physical conflict with the recipient of
those acts or threats. 6 In contrast to initial aggressors, provocateurs commit
lawful acts or utter lawful words that produce a physical confrontation. 5
58
Typical standards include that the defendant "provoke[s]" the confrontation
or "bring[s] on the difficulty.

'59

Generally, a provocateur loses eligibility for

53. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
54. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 9 (terming as a "difficulty... that it is unclear what it
means to be 'at fault' in causing the justifying circumstances"). Joshua Dressler argues that the
actor, despite not being entirely free from fault, should retain his right of self-defense in the
following hypothetical:
[I]fD asks V, an acquaintance, "how in the world can you be a stupid Yankee
fan?" to which Vtake[s] such umbrage that he pulls out a gun and threatens D
with it, D is justified in killing V... although D was not entirely free from
fault in the conflict.
supranote 3, § 18.02, at 224. While intent or purpose to cause a physical confrontation
suffices as fault barring a right of self-defense, see infra notes 60 62 and accompanying text, does
knowledge or recklessness suffice as fault? Consider the following examples involving
knowledge furnished by Kim Ferzan. "One may know he is inciting a bully by leaving one's
home. One may know she is encouraging rapists by dressing scantily." Ferzan, supra note 18, at
599. Ferzan concludes that "we are free to leave our homes and dress immodestly. Knowledge
that one might have to fend off the bully or the rapists does not render this conduct culpable or
impermissible." Id. at 599 600. Consider the following example involving recklessness. Suppose
someone consciously disregards a substantial risk that by painting her house blue, her crazy
neighbor will attack her. Robinson, supra note 8, at 5 6. If the crazy neighbor does attack her,
does she lose the right of self-defense? See id. at 6 (criticizing legal standards barring self-defense
in the absence of any culpability).
55. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.02, at 224 ("An aggressor 'has no right to a
claim of self-defense."' (quoting Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. 1986))).
56. See, e.g., id. ("[A]n aggressor... [is] one whose 'affirmative unlawful act [is]
reasonably calculated to produce an affray foreboding injurious or fatal consequences.'
Alternatively, he is one who threatens to unlawfully commit a battery upon another." (quoting
Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1233)).
57. See Brooks, supra note 32, at 541 (terming a provocateur as "someone who uses
language or conduct that is nonthreatening and nonviolent.., to intentionally incite (or provoke)
an attack so that the provocateur may then have a pretext for killing the other in ostensibly lawful
self-defense"); Ferzan, supra note 18, at 607 ("[W]hat aggressors do, but provocateurs do not, is
engage in behavior that renders them liable to defensive force.").
58. Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995) (barring self-defense where
the defendant "provoke[s the] trouble"); Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (utilizing the standard of "provoking the difficulty" to bar self-defense).
59. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:21 (2017) (barring self-defense to a defendant who "brings on a
difficulty"); see also State v. Slater, 644 S.E.2d 50, 52 (S.C. 2007) (denying defendant's request
for a jury instruction on self-defense).
DRESSLER,
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self-defense only if she intended to induce a confrontation.6" Some standards
require further that the actor provoke with the intent or purpose to cause
physical harm or death.6' For example, the Model Penal Code bars selfdefense for the use of deadly force if "the actor, with the purpose of causing
death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the
62
same encounter.
The contrived-defense doctrine also applies to the necessity (also known
as choice of evils or lesser evils) justification defense. 63 As Joshua Dressler
explains, "the defendant must come to the situation with clean hands. That is,
he must not have 'substantially contribute[d] to the emergency' or wrongfully
'placed himself in a situation in which he would be forced to engage in
criminal conduct."' 64 For example, the Code bars the choice of evils defense
"[w]hen the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation
requiring a choice of harms or evils" and the actor is charged with an offense
in which recklessness or negligence is sufficient to establish mens rea.65
Michael Hoffheimer concludes that "[a]ll states exclude the necessity defense
when the actor's wrongdoing brought about the claimed necessity. '66 As with
self-defense, an actor's merely causal contribution to the emergency situation
requiring a choice of evils should not suffice to bar the defense in the absence
60. See State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963) (barring self-defense where the
provocation is "willingly and knowingly calculated to lead to conflict"); Ferzan, supra note 18,
at 615 ("With respect to provocateurs, the law typically requires something extraordinarily
narrow-purpose to provoke the affray." (emphasis omitted)).
61. See, e.g., State v. Whitford, 799 A.2d 1034, 1046 (Conn. 2002) ("[I]n order to prove
provocation, the state must demonstrate that the defendant possessed a 'dual intent: (1) the intent
to cause physical injury or death, and (2) the intent to provoke."' (quoting State v. Turner, 637
A.2d 3, 4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994))).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
63. Necessity may be a defense if the actor's conduct avoids more harm than it causes or
constitutes the lesser evil. Id. § 3.02(1) ("(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged .... ").
64. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 22.02, at 289 (first quoting People v. Pepper, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d 877, 880 (Ct. App. 1996); then quoting United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir.
1991)).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). More precisely, if reckless in
creating situations of necessity, actors lose the defense if charged with offenses requiring either
recklessness or negligence. If merely negligent, actors lose the defense if charged with offenses
requiring negligence. Id.
66. Michael H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting
Choice-of-Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 191, 242 (2007); see also
DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 600 ("Like the Code, no jurisdiction that has addressed the question
permits the necessity defense in cases of purposeful created culpability.").
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of some wrongfulness or culpable fault. For example, the Code's commentary
supplies the example of a husband claiming the necessity defense for
speeding his pregnant wife to the hospital to deliver their child.6 Under a
causal contribution standard, the husband's defense-contriving conduct of
conceiving the child some nine months ago that caused the present
emergency would absurdly bar the defense. But surely the husband should
retain the defense in the apparent absence of any culpability or wrongdoing.
In addition to justification defenses, the contrived-defense doctrine applies
to excuse defenses,68 including duress.6 9 "All jurisdictions that bar the
necessity defense where an actor culpably created its conditions also do so
for duress.""0 The Code, for example, bars the duress defense entirely "if the
actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he
would be subjected to duress."'" If negligently placing herself in such a
situation, the Code limits liability to offenses requiring a mens rea of
negligence.2 The most common example of contrived duress occurs when an
actor joins a criminal organization."' As an English court explained, if a
defendant "voluntarily and with knowledge of its nature, joined a criminal
organisation or gang which he knew might bring pressure on him to commit
an offense ... he cannot avail himself of the defence of duress."' 7 Despite
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) cmt. 5, at 20 n.27 (AM. LAw INST. Official Draft &
Revised Comments 1985).
68. Dimock, supra note 2,at 553 (noting that actors who otherwise satisfy the excuse
defense of duress "will be barred from relying upon that defence if they have culpably created the
conditions under which they are subsequently coerced").
69. Duress is a defense to criminal conduct where the actor was coerced into committing
the crime by a threat of sufficient unlawful force. The Model Penal Code provision on duress, in
relevant part, is as follows:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of,or a threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

§ 2.09(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
70. DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 645.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 646 A.2d 1101, 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) ("[W]e
hold that where an actor recklessly.., places himself or herself in a situation where it is probable
that he or she would be subjected to duress [by joining a criminal enterprise], the defense of duress
is unavailable."); DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 23.01, at 299 ("[I]f D voluntarily joins a criminal
organization that she knows or has reason to know is likely to subject her to coercive threats at a
later time, she will not be permitted to claim the defense [of duress] if that foreseeable event
arises.").
74. R. v. Sharp [1987] QB 853 (HL) 861 (appeal taken from England).
MODEL PENAL CODE
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being an excuse defense, the same general rationale as to the justification
defenses of self-defense and necessity applies to duress: "[T]he requirement
that the coerced actor come to the situation free from fault is consistent with
the nature of the defense as an excuse. A person should not be permitted to
plead blamelessness, as an excuse implies, if he was culpably responsible for
[being subjected to duress]."" As Marc DeGirolami explains, the contriver
of a duress defense "is unexcused because he does not deserve to be excused
76
given his created culpability."
B. TheoreticalApproach-Grantthe Defense
While consideration of alternative approaches to the contrived-defense
doctrine came into prominence in German criminal law scholarship in the
1960S, 7 7 perhaps the first American scholar to critique the Legal approach
was George Fletcher in 1978. 7 8 Fletcher branded the law's approach of
barring contrived necessity defenses as "irrational." ' 79 But it was not until Paul
Robinson's "seminal"8 and "classic"'" 1985 article, Causing the Conditions
of One's Defense, that the doctrine captured the attention of American
scholars.82 Michael Moore chronicled the reception of Robinson's article
when it was first presented at a conference: "The reaction to Robinson's paper
75. Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its ProperLimits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (1989).
76. DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 646. DeGirolami further explains how the rationale for the
contriving doctrine applies equally to justification and excuse defenses:
Whether an otherwise wrongful act is excused depends in part upon those
salient circumstances-circumstances that are relevant universally and
irrespective of the special qualities of an individual actor that attend the act.
Likewise, whether an otherwise wrongful act is justified also depends upon an
evaluation of the pertinent circumstances.
Id.
77. See Katz, supra note 17, at 588 (noting that while the doctrine was "unjustly neglected"
in America it has not been "elsewhere, most notably German criminal law scholarship, which has
for several decades now paid it the attention it deserves, largely through the efforts of a single
scholar, Joachim Hruschka, who breathed new life into this topic starting in the late 1960s"). For
other acknowledgements of the contribution of German scholarship, see Finkelstein & Katz,
supra note 10, at 480 (noting that the doctrine is discussed in the German literature under the
rubric of "Actio Libera in Causa"); Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 147 (tracing the roots of Michael
Moore's approach to German law).
78. FLETCHER, supra note 27, § 10.2, at 797.
79. Id.
80. DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 615.
81. Garvey, supra note 13, at 354 n.72.
82. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 2.
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by the leading Anglo-American and German criminal-law scholars.., was
'Of course-that is what we all teach."' 83 Though there are a number of
different accounts of the Theoretical approach offered by scholars,8 4 my focus
will be on the "traditional,"85 "orthodox, ' '1 6 "reigning,"" or "causal"8 8 view.
"[It is] the most widely accepted[] view.., among Anglo-American criminal
law scholars"8 9 and has "dominated the literature." 9 "It is the view most
forcefully articulated by Michael Moore and Paul Robinson." 91 Most
"scholars generally follow Robinson's view that [creating the conditions for
'
the defense] should almost never bar the defense."92
83. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 36 n.49 (1993).
84. For discussion of the principal alternative theoretical approach, see infra note 98.
85. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 482.
86. Dimock, supra note 2, at 558.
87. Katz, supra note 17, at 589.
88. Dimock, supra note 2, at 559.
89. Katz, supra note 17, at 589.
90. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 482.
91. Katz, supranote 17, at 589. Moore's articulation of this traditional, causal view explains
the basis for holding defense-contrivers liable for their early stage, defense-contriving conduct:
"[If a] court can find a voluntary act by the defendant, accompanied at that time by whatever
culpable mens rea that is required, which act in fact and proximately causes some legally
prohibited states of affairs, then the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm." MOORE,
supra note 83, at 35 36. Under this view, if all of the requisite elements for criminal liability are
present at the early, defense-contriving stage, the contriver is criminally liable based on the early
stage conduct alone, regardless of whether the contriver does or does not have a defense for
conduct at the later stage.
For example, intending to kill a victim under circumstances where the killing would be
justified in self-defense, at T1 a provocateur provokes the victim into unlawfully and unjustifiably
aggressing against the provocateur. At T2, facing the victim's unlawful and unjustifiable
aggression, the provocateur kills the victim and claims justified self-defense. While justified in
self-defense at T2, the provocateur lacks a defense for her conduct at T1. The traditional, casual
view maintains that the provocateur's conduct at T1 satisfies the offense elements of murder. At
T1, the defendant with the intent to kill commits the voluntary act of provoking the victim. Despite
the act of killing appearing to occur at T2, the traditional, causal view insists that the act of
provocation at T1 is both the factual, or but for, and proximate cause of the victim's death. As
Finkelstein & Katz characterize it, the provocateur "voluntarily and intentionally caused himself
[at T1] to attack [at T2]." Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 483 ("Because the defendant
possessed the requisite mens rea at the earlier moment [T1] at which he voluntarily and
intentionally caused himself to attack, he is liable for the attack [at T2], and the claim of selfdefense should be unavailable to him."). Because the provocateur satisfies the offense elements
of murder at T1 (for which there is no justification defense because the victim has not yet posed
a threat), the defendant is liable for a murder committed at T1 despite having a justification
defense at T2. The key to understanding this causal view is the specification of the act that is the
cause of death not at the more obvious time at T2 when the provocateur pulls the trigger of the
gun but instead at T1 the act of provocation.
92. DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 599. Robinson's view is most closely associated with his
article from thirty years ago (Robinson, supra note 8) that has been termed "the most exhaustive
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Illustrating his account, Robinson considers the following hypothetical
involving the necessity defense: "Assume that an actor sets a fire that
threatens a nearby town to create the conditions that will justify his using his
enemy's farm as a firebreak."9 3 Robinson explains that if an actor "is not only
culpable as to causing the defense conditions, but also has a culpable state of
mind as to causing himself to engage in the conduct constituting the offense,
the state should punish him for causing the ultimate justified or excused
conduct" that he subsequently performs.94 The actor's liability "is properly
based on his initial conduct of causing the defense conditions with his
accompanying scheming intention, not on the justified or excused conduct
that he subsequently performs."95 Robinson's account "allow[s] the actor a
defense for the immediate conduct constituting the offense, but would
separately impose liability on the basis of the actor's earlier conduct in
culpably causing the conditions of his defense. 96
Fully understanding Robinson's analysis of the hypothetical requires
carefully distinguishing between two temporal stages. At TI, the actor
intentionally sets a fire with the further accompanying intention of creating
the justificatory circumstances by which he can burn down his enemy's farm.
At T2, with the fire threatening a nearby town, the actor intentionally burns
down his enemy's farm as a firebreak that saves the town. The actor receives
the defense of necessity for his T2 conduct of burning down his enemy's
farm. That the actor contrived to do so at T I is irrelevant in assessing the T2
conduct. Similarly, the actor's justified T2 conduct is irrelevant in assessing
his T I conduct. At TI, the actor committed the voluntary act of setting a fire
with the accompanying intention that he would ultimately burn down his
enemy's farm under circumstances supporting a necessity defense. By
intentionally "causing himself [at TI] to engage in the conduct constituting
the offense [at T2]," 9 the actor is liable for the intentional destruction of the
enemy's property based on his TI conduct alone. That is, the initial act of

scholarly treatment of created culpability ...[and] seminal," DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 615;
"the classic discussion of this general problem," Garvey, supra note 13, at 354 n.72; and "the
most fully developed proposal [regarding the issue]," Luban, supra note 4, at 2387. For other
scholars agreeing with Robinson's view, see DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 22.02, at 289 n.38
(regarding the necessity defense); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1, at 564 (5th ed.
2010) (regarding the necessity defense); Dressler, supra note 75, at 1342 n.63 (regarding the
duress defense when conceptualized as a justification defense).
93. Robinson, supra note 8, at 28.
94. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
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setting the fire at TI, not the burning of the enemy's farm as a firebreak at
T2, constitutes the cause of the destruction of the enemy's farm. While the
T2 conduct enjoys a justification defense of necessity, the TI conduct does
not. At TI, when the actor set the initial fire, there were no justifying
conditions of necessity. 9 8
Robinson catalogues the advantages of allowing contrived defenses (the
Theoretical approach) and the disadvantages of disallowing them (the Legal
approach).9 9 First, barring the contriver's defense "may reduce his incentive
to set the firebreak and save the town."' 0 Second, "[w]here a forest fire has
been set, for whatever reason, society wants any and all persons to set a
firebreak and save a threatened town. To withdraw a defense for such conduct
is to punish and discourage it."'' Third, denying the contrived defense
inappropriately allows the owner of the field, who values his crop more than
he does the lives of the townspeople, to lawfully interfere with the actor's

98. The principal alternative to the traditional, causal view is the "perpetration-by-means"
view. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488 89; Katz, supra note 17, at 591 92 (referring to
the causal view as the "reigning" view and referring to the causal view and the perpetration-bymeans view collectively as "the Two Dominant" views). It is similar to the doctrine that holds an
actor liable for causing a crime to be committed by an innocent. Robinson, supra note 8, at 36
(referring to his own account as supported by the principle of and "analogous to liability for
causing a crime by an innocent"). The contrived-defense doctrine "treats the justified, excused,
or unaware actor as the 'innocent actor' who was caused to engage in the criminal conduct by the
actor's prior culpable actions." Id. The contriver is the innocent "principal while he is committing
the crime [at T2] and an accomplice to his own future self while he is preparing for the crime [at
T1]." Finkelstein & Katz, supranote 10, at 488 89. It might be helpful in understanding this view
to think of the contriver "as essentially two actors, an 'early self and a 'later self.' who act in
complicity with each other." Katz, supranote 17, at 591. The early self (as instigating accomplice)
contrives that the later self (as principal) will commit the crime under circumstances where the
later self will have a defense. Id. at 594. "[A]lthough the Later Self has a defense, the Earlier Self
does not, which is why we can hold the Earlier Self liable for using the Later Self as an innocent
means for committing the crime." Id.
Because both the traditional, causal view and the perpetration-by-means view "will usually
produce the same outcome," little turns on which approach is employed. Finkelstein & Katz,
supra note 10, at 489. As Susan Dimock concludes, "[t]here seems to be no substantive moral
difference between the person who brings about the death of his intended victim through the
agency of an innocent, subordinate, co-conspirator or himself as a mere means." Dimock, supra
note 2, at 567. "Somewhat analogous objections [as levied against the traditional, causal view]
can be registered to ... the so-called perpetration by means approach." Katz, supra note 17, at
594. For criticisms of the perpetration-by-means view, see Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at
491 92; Katz, supra note 17, at 594 95. The traditional, causal view and perpetration-by-means
view are simply different versions of the Theoretical approach.
99. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 27 29.
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
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attempt to set fire to the field. 102Fourth, allowing the contrived defense avoids
'an anomalous situation in which the actor and another person may work
side-by-side engaging in the same conduct-here, setting fire to the same
field-yet one will be justified and the other will not."'' 13
Though Robinson views allocating the rights of third parties to either aid
or hinder the defense-contriver as an advantage of the Theoretical approach,
Larry Alexander reasons in the opposite direction. 14 He defends the
Theoretical approach's granting contrived defenses by reasoning from the
rights of third parties.0 5 Through the following example, drawn from the film
Dolores Claiborne, Alexander first establishes that a defense-contriver is
criminally liable at the early, contriving stage:
At TI [Claibome] plies her abusive husband with drink, says things
to him that she believes will almost certainly lead him to attack her
physically, and begins running from him in the direction of her [preestablished] booby trap. At T2 she runs past the booby trap with her
husband in hot pursuit, resulting in his death [when he runs into the
06
booby trap]. 1
According to Alexander, at TI Claiborne consciously created a risk that
she would have to kill her abusive husband, who was a culpable aggressor,
in self-defense at T2.10 If Claiborne not only intended to kill if culpably
attacked but intended the culpable attack to occur, then Claiborne would be
liable for an intentional murder based on her TI conduct. 108 Nonetheless,
should Claiborne be justified in self-defense at T2 against her husband's
culpable aggression?

102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. ("It is the nature of justified conduct that it either is or is not justified-depending
on whether it causes a net societal benefit-regardless of the particular state of mind, past or
present, of the actor.").
104. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 626.
105. See id.

106. Id. (citing

DOLORES CLAIBORNE

107. Id. at 627.
108. See id. at 625.

(Castle Rock Entertainment 1995)).
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To confirm that Claiborne should retain her defense despite contriving it,
Alexander modifies the Claiborne example:
Suppose a third party knows... Claibome's plans and watches
[her] plans unfold .... [S]uppose Claibome's husband manages to
dodge the booby trap and is now about to strangle her. May the third
party, who has a gun, intervene and shoot.., the husband? Or must
the third party remain neutral? 10 9
Alexander answers that the third party is justified in intervening on
Claiborne's behalf and shooting the husband."10 Despite Claiborne initiating
the incident, the husband is a "murderous culpable aggressor[] whose attack[]
[is] neither justified nor excused by the provocations.""' As a result, despite
Claiborne's intentional murder liability (based on TI conduct), Claiborne is
less culpable than the husband at T2 given that he is a culpable aggressor and
she is not.1 2 Because a third party "should come to the defense of the less
culpable actor," a third party should aid Claiborne and not her husband.' If
a third party should intervene on Claiborne's behalf, then, Alexander
concludes, Claiborne is justified in self-defense.' 1'
Not all criminal theorists agree. Some take the position, like the Legal
approach, that contriving a defense bars the defense." 5 The earlier culpable
conduct at TI taints, undermines, or precludes the otherwise exculpatory
effect of a defense for conduct at T2.116 Kim Ferzan and Marc DeGirolami
advocate barring contrived self-defense and necessity, respectively. I"Ferzan
concedes, however, that the determination of third-party rights to intervene
is more difficult under the Legal approach." 8 While the intervention of third
parties is still possible, "there would be complex questions about whom the

109. Id. at 626.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 116 117 and accompanying text.
116. See Dimock, supranote 2, at 557 59 (arguing that contrivers' "moral fault at TI defeats
the normally exculpating influence of [their] defence at T2").
117. DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 601 ("[T]he defendant's purpose, knowledge, or
recklessness in engaging in conduct that directly causes a choice of evils should create a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant is barred from asserting the necessity defense."); Ferzan, supra
note 18, at 616 ("[P]rovocateurs forfeit their defensive rights when they consciously disregard the
substantial and unjustifiable risk that their words or conduct will cause another person to attack
them.").
118. See Ferzan, supra note 18, at 615.
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third party ought to privilege.""' 9 If "sometimes, there are just two
wrongdoers," each unjustified, that complicates the justifiability of a third
party intervening to aid either the unjustified provocateur or the unjustified
20
provocatee. 1
Yet the greater clarity and precision of the Theoretical approach in
allocating third-party rights may come at the cost of less accuracy. Our
intuitions may be unclear as to who is the more culpable party and who is
comparatively more deserving of third-party aid. Consider the above example
of Able and Baker.121 True, Able's act of taunting is independently lawful and
Baker's provoked attempt to kill Able is unlawful. 122 Nonetheless, one might
view Able as more culpable for culpably initiating and instigating the
confrontation. Consider also the highly controversial case of George
Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin. 123 Suppose, as some speculated, that
Zimmerman intentionally contrived his claim of self-defense by following
and harassing Martin into attacking him. 124 Which party is more culpable and
on whose behalf could third parties have intervened? By granting Able and
Zimmerman a defense-contriving justified self-defense, the Theoretical
approach privileges third parties to intervene only on contrivers' behalfAble and Zimmerman. By barring Able and a defense-contriving Zimmerman
self-defense, the Legal approach makes it unclear on whose behalf third
parties could intervene. In its very lack of clarity, the Legal approach might
well be more accurate in more closely reflecting our uncertain intuitions as
to which party is more culpable and on which side third parties should
intervene. The Theoretical approach, though enjoying greater clarity and
precision, may be less accurate in that it may yield the intuitively wrong
result. As Kim Ferzan asks, "Why think that third parties ought to intervene
[at all] when both sides are in the wrong?' 12 Whether the Theoretical

approach's greater precision is a virtue or vice, however, is irrelevant if it
simply does not work. The next section presents criticisms of the Theoretical

approach that question whether it succeeds in holding contrivers liable.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 14 24.
122. Daniel M. Farrell, What Should We Say About Contrived 'Self-Defense' Defenses?, 7

CRIM. L. & PHIL. 571, 585 (2013) (terming provoked victims' aggression against contrivers as
"voluntary, wrongful attacks"); Robinson, supra note 8, at 5 n.14 (characterizing a provocatee's
force against a provocateur as "an unjustified attack").
123. For an account of the case and the surrounding controversy, see Moore, supra note 32,
at 1671 73.
124. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 32, at 536 (entertaining the possibility that Zimmerman
intentionally contrived the circumstances for his claim of self-defense).
125. Ferzan, supra note 18, at 602.
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C. Criticismsof TheoreticalApproach
There are two principal bases for criticism of the Theoretical approach.
Through the same analytical tool of conditional intent, this Article resolves
and neutralizes the first basis for criticism but builds on and advances the
second. First, the Theoretical approach is overbroad and yields a number of
absurd results, troublesome counterexamples, and conceptual puzzles. Part
III.B both presents these criticisms as well as resolves them. Second, the
Theoretical approach imposes criminal liability for contriving defenses
despite the absence of requisite offense elements. Criminal liability without
satisfying requisite offense elements generally violates the Legality
principle. 12 6 As Susan Dimock notes, "[g]iving up the principle of legality [in
order to implement the contriving defense doctrine] would be a bitter pill to
12
swallow, as likely to kill the patient as cure him."' 1
This section presents arguments that the Theoretical approach holds
contrivers liable in the absence of the requisite elements of proximate
causation and mens rea. 128 Perhaps neither of these criticisms is entirely
successful. The foremost critics of the Theoretical approach, Claire
Finkelstein and Leo Katz, concede that "none of the objections deals the
126. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 20, at 367 ("Legality requires that persons are not subject
to punishment unless they breach a penal statute, and a defendant who does not satisfy the mens
rea of a statute is no more worthy of punishment than a defendant who does not satisfy its actus
reus."); see also Robinson, supra note 8, at 60-61 n. 199 (referring to the "illogic of conviction
absent proof of a required element").
127. Dimock, supra note 2, at 564.
128. There are two additional requisite elements that some commentators claim defensecontrivers do not satisfy. First, the actus reus for attempts. See Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10,
at 487 (arguing that the Theoretical approach imposes attempt liability without contrivers
committing the requisite substantial step toward the completed offense); Katz, supra note 17, at
594 (maintaining that the Theoretical approach finds contrivers "guilty of an attempt at a
counterintuitively early stage of wrongdoing"). Second, the actus reus of conduct offenses.
Finkelstein and Katz explain as follows:
[I]t seems to strain ordinary meaning to say that a person is entering a building
just because he is doing something that will later cause himself to enter a
building, especially when the thing he is doing is an action as different from
entering a building as visiting a hypnotist [or consuming alcohol] .... [T]o
cause a burglary is not to burglarize.
Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 485 (emphasis added). Similarly, neither consuming alcohol
nor becoming hypnotized can satisfy the actus reus requirement of rape-nonconsensual
intercourse. Katz, supra note 17, at 592. Getting oneself hypnotized or intoxicated is not itself
engaging in nonconsensual intercourse. Id. (noting that "the act of causing oneself to have
intercourse strikes many as ethically quite different from the act of having intercourse"). As
Finkelstein and Katz characterize it, "to cause a rape is not to rape." Finkelstein & Katz, supra
note 10, at485.
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approach a mortal blow."' 2 9 They merely "diminish its attractiveness."' 30 But
one of the criticisms-contrivers of justification defenses lack the requisite
mens rea for liability under the Theoretical approach-serves as a building
block in a more persuasive argument, in Part III, utilizing the doctrine of
conditional intent.
1.

Proximate Causation

Perhaps the element most commonly cited as unsatisfied by defensecontrivers under the Theoretical approach is proximate causation.' 3' Margaret
Raymond finds that Robinson's account holds contrivers liable despite the
absence of causation.'3 2 Raymond considers the situation of"X taunts Y, and
Y responds with unlawful violence, at which point X kills Y in selfdefense."' 3 3 Under Robinson's account, if X knew or intended that Y would
respond with lethal force, then X is liable for Y's death based on X's initial
taunt. 3 4 But Raymond observes that perhaps "Y's unlawful and homicidal
act is a supervening cause of his own death," thereby excluding X as the
proximate cause of Y's death. 3 5 "It may have been foreseeable that [Y] would
act unlawfully, but his decision is an act of 'free, deliberate and informed'
human intervention which can break the causal chain."'13 6 Other
129. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 484.
130. Id.
131. Dimock, supra note 2, at 558 59 ("The problem... is that normally the intervening
actions of other agents or highly unusual situational circumstances (the actions of the attacker,
provocateur... [or] coercer... ) would break the chain of causation, and so undermine the
finding of proximate causation."); see infra notes 132 37 and accompanying text. Even Robinson
appears to concede that the requisite causation element is absent:
It is likely, however, that without a special rule expressly permitting liability
under such a causing-one's-defense analysis, the causation requirement might
frequently be held to be unsatisfied, i.e., the ultimate offense might be "too
remote" from the actor's conduct in causing the conditions of his defense for
the actor to be held accountable for the offense.
Robinson, supra note 8, at 37 n.128. Robinson's solution is the contriving defense doctrine
itself-"a special rule expressly permitting liability under such a causing-one's-defense analysis."
Id. That is, the doctrine supplies the missing requisite causation element by fiat or by a legal
fiction.
132. Margaret Raymond, Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary Interest in the
Law ofSelf-Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 335 (2010).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 14.03 [C] [6] (5th ed.
2009)).
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commentators agree that contrivers often fail to satisfy the requisite element
of proximate causation under the Theoretical approach. 3 7 But proximate
causation is notoriously vague,'3 8 and even Katz concedes that the requisite
element of proximate causation is not clearly missing. 31 9

2.

Mens Rea

For the purposes of this Article, the most important requisite element
arguably absent under the Theoretical approach is mens rea. Finkelstein and
Katz illustrate the lack of mens rea with the following example: "Imagine the
defendant who drinks and drinks, hoping to acquire enough courage to carry
out his intended crime. He eventually lapses into an irresponsible state in
which he has finally acquired the resolution he needs to carry out the
killing."'40 Under the Theoretical approach, the defendant has the requisite
mens rea of intent to kill prior to his drinking or at least prior to reaching a
state of irresponsibility.'
But according to Finkelstein and Katz, the

137. See Ferzan, supra note 18, at 603 ("[T]he respondent's [Y's] behavior should be a
voluntary action that cuts the causal chain."); Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 485 ("The
problem is that the defendant's action must be the proximate cause of the victim's death in order
for him to be liable on the basis of his earlier act. But many of the cases that fall in the domain of
the [defense-contriving doctrine] exemplify 'but for,' and not proximate, causation."); Katz,
supranote 17, at 593 ("[T]he victim's [Y's] reaction to the provocation was an intervening cause.
That is, someone might say that the victim's reaction was a voluntary act of the sort that is deemed
to break the chain of proximate causation.").
138. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 14.03, at 189 ("The concept of 'proximate causation' is

obscure."); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (1998) (noting
the "degree of fluidity and uncertainty in the concept of causation"); SANFORD KADISH ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 576 (9th ed. 2012) (referring to the "elusive concept of
proximate cause").
139. Katz, supra note 17, at 593. Though suggesting that the victim's reaction might be a
supervening cause precluding the contriver from being the proximate cause, Katz explains why
this is not clear:
To be sure, ordinarily the chain of proximate causation is deemed to be broken
chiefly when someone deliberately takes an action that is intended to bring
about the ultimate victim's death. That was obviously not the case here, since
the intervening actions of the victim were not intended to bring about the
victim's death. (He did not commit suicide.)
Id.
140. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488.
141. Id. (citing Robinson, supra note 8, at 7 8).
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defendant merely exhibits "the intention to acquire the intention to kill. And
42
this is probably not sufficient for the mens rea for murder.'
In addition, the presence of exculpatory circumstances may suggest the
absence of culpable mens rea.143 Katz argues that a defense-contriver does not
simply have the intent to commit an offense, but the intent to commit an
offense under exculpatory circumstances. 144 "And that arguably changes his
mens rea from blameworthy to not.' 1 45 Katz considers the common situation
of the provocateur seeking to kill in self-defense. 14 6 The provocateur does not
simply have the intent to kill, but the intent to kill in self-defense. 14 "But
since having the intention of killing someone in self-defense is arguably a
perfectly innocent intention, unlike the intention to kill him pure and simple,
it is not clear that this defendant has the kind of guilty mind we require for

conviction."

148

While none of these criticisms may be clearly persuasive, 149 this Article
builds on Finkelstein and Katz's analysis. It adopts Finkelstein's broad
suggestion that the Theoretical approach may simply not work for
justification defenses, 50 and advances Katz's narrower point that a selfdefense-contriver does not simply have the intent to kill but the intent to kill
in self-defense.' 5 ' (Or more generally, contrivers of justification defenses do
not simply have the intent to commit crime X but the intent to commit crime
X justifiably.)
142. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488 (maintaining that "he does not necessarily
display the intention to kill").
143. Though not taking a position on whether mens rea is absent, Ferzan seems to recognize
the issue as genuine:
Is the correct question, "May one engage in conduct so that one may purposely
kill?" or is the question, "May one engage in conduct so that one may
purposefully and justifiably kill?" That is, can the provocateur build in the
justifiability of his conduct at t2 in determining whether his [conduct is]
culpable and therefore impermissible at ti?
Ferzan, supra note 18, at 618. Ferzan's focus is less on whether the provocateur has the requisite
mens rea and more on whether the provocateur forfeits a right of self-defense against the
wrongfully aggressing provocatee. See id. at 614 21.
144. See Katz, supra note 17, at 593.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.("The defendant who provokes his victim into attacking him is not simply aiming to
kill his victim. He is aiming to kill his victim in self-defense.").
148. Id.
149. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 484.
150. See Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 160 ("[S]omeone might want to question whether the
causing-the-conditions approach is even correct for justifications.").
151. See Katz, supra note 17, at 593.
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Katz's insight runs into two possible difficulties. First, the requisite mens
rea of an offense is often more narrow and technical.'5 2 For example, the
requisite mens rea of murder is the intent to kill.'53 There may be no particular
requirement that the intent to kill be sufficiently blameworthy.'5 4 That is, all
that may be required is a particular mental state, not a level of blameworthy
culpability.' 55 As a result, whether an actor has merely the intent to kill or the
intent to kill justifiably or the intent to kill cruelly or the intent to kill gently
and humanely, each could satisfy the requisite mens rea of murder. Stating it
differently, Katz's point is more morally persuasive than legally persuasive.
Second, the Theoretical approach asserts that defenses at T2 are completely
independent of, and unavailable to, contrivers' TI conduct. 5 6 As a result,
contrivers' justification at T2 is unavailable to inform the assessment of their
mens rea at T1. That contrivers are justified at T2 cannot be used to claim, as
Katz does, that contrivers, at T 1, have the intent to act justifiably.
As discussed in the next two Parts, the conditional intent doctrine supports
Katz's insight. If the intent of contrivers of justification defenses is
conditional-conditioned on engaging in conduct if and only if justifiedthe conditional intent doctrine avoids both of the above possible difficulties
for Katz's view. Applying the doctrine to contrivers of justification defenses
not only allows Katz's insight to find a footing in existing criminal law
doctrine but also requires consideration of contrivers' justification defenses
at T2 in order to assess their mens rea at TI. The next Part introduces this
doctrine of conditional intent.

152. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 10.02, at 118 (distinguishing between the older, broader,
morally culpable or blameworthy meaning of mens rea versus the more modem, narrower,
elemental meaning of mens rea as a mental state).
153. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2017) ("A person is guilty of murder in the
second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or a third person .. "); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(a) (2017) ("A criminal homicide
constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.").
154. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 397 (noting the distinction between "normative and
descriptive" conceptions of mens rea, Fletcher explains that "'intent' may refer either to a state
of intending (regardless of blame) or it may refer to an intent to act under circumstances ... that
render an act properly subject to blame").
155. See DRESSLER, supranote 3, § 10.02, at 119 (noting that under the more modem, narrow,
elemental approach to mens rea all that is required is that the actor have the mental state of an
intent to kill regardless of whether that intent is otherwise morally blameworthy or culpable).
156. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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CONDITIONAL INTENT

After explaining how defense-contrivers' intent is conditional, this Part
supplies a brief overview of the doctrine of conditional intent. It presents and
explains the Model Penal Code's formulation of the doctrine, its codification
in state statutes, and its application in state and federal case law. Next, this
Part canvasses the non-Model Penal Code formulations of the doctrine and
sorts them into three groups. The common denominator of these three groups
and the Code is that intent conditioned on entirely lawful conduct does not
suffice as the requisite intent satisfying the mens rea of an offense.
A. Conditionality in Defense-Contriving
Defense-contrivers' intent is not merely to commit the conduct
constituting the crime. It may not even be to commit the conduct under
circumstances satisfying a defense. Rather, the intent is generally to commit
conduct if and only if doing so satisfies the conditions of a defense. 15 7 That
is, a contriver's intent is conditional-conditioned on satisfying the
requirements of a defense. Consider again the above example of Able and
Baker. Contriving to kill Baker in justified self-defense, Able intends at TI
to kill Baker at T2 and under the Theoretical approach thereby satisfies the
requisite mens rea element of intent to kill for the offense of murder at TI.
But does Able truly have intent, at TI, to kill? If Baker does not unlawfully
aggress against him, Able will not kill Baker. If Baker does unlawfully
aggress against Able but only uses non-lethal force, Able will not kill Baker.
Able only intends to kill on satisfaction of the conditions that (i) Baker does
unlawfully attack him, (ii) Baker uses lethal force, and, more generally,
(iii) killing Baker constitutes justified self-defense. Therefore, Able does not
merely have the intent to kill or even the mere intent to kill justifiably. Rather,
157. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 627 (finding, after considering various examples, that
provocateurs intend "to kill their attackers if but only if the latter culpably attacked them");
cf Farrell, supra note 122, at 583 ("[T]he manipulator's [provocateur's] plan leaves him free to
respond or not respond to his target's response to his provocation.").
To further highlight how Able's intent to kill is conditional in the above example, contrast
that with the following example involving Able 2 and Baker 2. All the same facts apply except
that Able 2 intends to kill Baker 2 regardless of whether justificatory circumstances are present.
Able 2 would prefer to kill Baker 2 in self-defense. But if the justificatory circumstances are
absent, then Able 2 will kill Baker 2 anyway. Both Able and Able 2 might share the intent not
merely to kill but to kill justifiably. But only Able has a conditional intent to kill (Able will kill if
and only if justificatory circumstances are present). Able 2's intent is unconditional. Cf Ferzan,
supra note 18, at 619 (contrasting contrivers intending to kill versus contrivers intending to kill
only in limited circumstances).
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Able has a conditional intent to kill-conditioned on the killing satisfying the
requirements of self-defense. The next sections explore the various
formulations of the conditional intent doctrine. The doctrine determines
whether conditional intent suffices as the requisite mens rea of intent. The
significance of the doctrine, for our purposes, is that it reveals the inability of
the Theoretical approach to establish the requisite mens rea necessary to hold
contrivers criminally liable.
B. Model Penal Code
The most influential formulation of the conditional intent doctrine is from
the Model Penal Code.'5 8 The Code's provision, expressed in terms of
purpose rather than intent,' 59 is as follows: "When a particular purpose is an
element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense.' ' 6 That is, conditional intent
suffices as actual intent unless the condition negates the harm or evil that the
offense seeks to prevent. The Code's formulation is codified in numerous

158. See United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the Code's
test almost supplants the issue itself, the court stated "the question becomes not whether a
defendant's conditional intent is sufficient to satisfy an intent element of a statute, but which
conditions negative the harm sought to be prevented by a statute and which will not"); Yaffe,
supra note 39, at 276 ("The Model Penal Code has had a strong influence on the view of
conditional intent espoused by philosophers of criminal law and has also influenced judges'
decisions ... and it is accepted verbatim in ...a standard [criminal law] reference text."); id. at
309 (referring to "the almost wholesale acceptance of the Model Penal Code's approach" to
conditional intent); see also LAFAVE, supra note 92, § 5.2, at 267 (noting that "[t]he Model Penal
Code sums.., up" existing case law and supplies the "reasoning" that the Supreme Court
employed in its most recent case involving conditional intent).
159. For the equivalence of conditional purpose and conditional intent, see sources cited
supra note 158 and infra note 161.
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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state statutes 16 1 and utilized in many jurisdictions' case law. 162 The Code's
Commentary notes that the Code's provision is both "a statement and
1 63
rationalization of the present law.'
The Commentary supplies some examples. "[I]t is no less a burglary if the
defendant's purpose was to steal only if no one was at home or if he found
the object he sought."' 64 That is, the conditions of the burglary occurring only
if the dwelling was empty and a particular item was present fail to negate the
harm or evil that the offense of burglary seeks to prevent. 165 As a result,
conditional intent suffices as actual intent and the defendant satisfies the
requisite mens rea necessary for liability for the offense of burglary. "But it
would not be an assault with intent to rape, if the defendant's purpose was to
accomplish the sexual relation only if the mature victim consented; the
166
condition negatives the evil with which the law has been framed to deal."'
That is, the defendant's lawful condition-consensual and therefore lawful
intercourse-negates the harm or evil that the offense seeks to prevent.
Therefore, the defendant's conditional intent fails to suffice as actual intent. 161
Lacking the requisite mens rea of intent, the defendant is not liable for assault
with intent to commit rape. However, if the defendant conditioned his intent

161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (2017) ("The fact that a defendant's intention
was conditional is immaterial unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the statute defining the offense."); FLAW. REV. STAT. § 702-209 (2017) ("When a
particular intent is necessary to establish an element of an offense, it is immaterial that such intent
was conditional unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
prohibiting the offense."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(65) (2017) ("When a particular purpose
is an element of an offense, the element is established although the purpose is conditional, unless
the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.");
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(f) (2017) ("When a particular intent is an element of an offense, the
element is established although such intent is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm
or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.").
162. See, e.g., McKinnon v. United States, 644 A.2d 438, 442 (D.C. 1994) (affirming
conviction for burglary where defendant conditioned his intent to commit assault on victim's noncompliance with a demand that defendant had no right to impose because "[e]ntering an occupied
dwelling with such an intent is within the range of evils the burglary statute was intended to
prevent"); State v. Ferrel, 679 P.2d 224, 229 (Mont. 1984) (reversing conviction for theft where
defendant conditioned her intent to permanently deprive victim of his property on victim's failure
to make lawful restitution because the condition negated the harm or evil sought to be prevented
by the theft statute).
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 8, at 247 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985).
164. Id.

165. Id. ("The condition does not negative the evil that the law defining burglary is designed
to control, irrespective of whether the condition is fulfilled or fails.").
166. Id.

167. Id.
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to have intercourse with the victim only if the victim resisted, then the
condition would fail to negate the harm or evil that the offense seeks to
prevent.'68 As a result, conditional intent would suffice as actual intent and
satisfy the requisite mens rea necessary for liability.'69
Lacking a federal statute embodying the conditional intent doctrine,
federal courts have relied on the Code's formulation in interpreting federal
statutes requiring the mens rea of intent. 170 In Holloway v. United States, the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a carjacker who has a
conditional intent to kill if the victim resists satisfies the mens rea element of
the carjacking statute requiring "an intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm.' 17' 1 In upholding the defendant's conviction and finding that his
conditional intent sufficed as actual intent, the Court surveyed the leading
cases and scholarly authority 17'2 and found that such authority "reflects the
views endorsed by the authors of the Model [Penal] Code.'' 171 Applying the
Code's formulation, the Court found the carjacker's "condition that the driver
surrender the car was the precise evil that Congress wanted to prevent."'174 As
a result, the carjacker's conditional intent sufficed as actual intent under the
Code's formulation. 17 In concluding its survey of case law and scholarly
authority, the Court stated that "[t]he core principle that emerges from these
sources is that a defendant may not negate a proscribed intent by requiring
168. Cf id. ("If his purpose was to overcome her will f she resisted, he would of course be
guilty of the crime.")
169. Wayne LaFave supplies two additional examples applying the Code's formulation:
For one to take another's property intending to give it back if he inherits other
property involves a condition that does not negative the evil which larceny
seeks to prevent; but taking it intending to restore it if it is not his own property
does involve a condition which negatives that evil.
LAFAVE, supra note 92, § 5.2, at 267.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 1997) (relying on and
applying the Code's formulation, the court reasoned "[t]he fact that a defendant is able to achieve
the goal of obtaining the car [in a carjacking in which defendant had a conditional intent to kill
victim upon non-compliance with demand to relinquish the car] without resorting to the infliction
of death or serious bodily harm obviously does not negate the intent to cause such harm in order
to obtain the car"); United States v. Holloway, 921 F. Supp. 155, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying
the Code's formulation to a carjacking where the defendant conditioned his intent to kill on the
victim's non-compliance with a demand to surrender the car, the court concluded "[t]he evil
sought to be prevented by [the federal carjacking statute] is not 'negatived' by the condition, it is
the condition").
171. 526 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1999).
172. See id. at 9 11.
173. Id. at 10 11.
174. Id. at 1I n.ll.
175. See id.
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the victim to comply with a condition the defendant has no right to
impose."

76

C. Non-Model Penal Code Formulations
Apart from the Code's formulation, cases applying the conditional intent
doctrine fall into three groupings. Most cases applying the doctrine involve
defendants charged with assault with intent to kill for making conditional
threats to harm their victims upon non-compliance with defendants'
demands. 177 First, a substantial minority of courts holds that conditional intent
fails to satisfy the mens rea element of an offense requiring intent. 178 They
reason that if the defendant's intent is conditioned on a future event that may
or may not occur, the defendant lacks the intent required by the offense. 171
Second, when intent is conditioned on a threatened victim complying with a
demand that the defendant has no lawful right to impose, the defendant's
conditional intent suffices as actual intent. 8 ' The Supreme Court of Illinois

176. Id. at 11.
177. See Samuel E. Peckham, Note, Holloway v. United States: The United States Supreme
Court Examines "ConditionalIntent" in the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 30 SETON HALL L. REv.
602, 605 (2000) ("Conditional intent is best exemplified by an assault during which a defendant
merely threatens to inflict injury unless the victim complies with certain demands, but never
actually harms the victim.").
178. See, e.g., United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 664 65 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing
conviction for carjacking requiring an intent to kill where defendant's "mere conditional intent to
cause harm if [the victim] resists is simply not enough to satisfy ... [the] specific intent
requirement" of the offense); Craddock v. State, 37 So. 2d 778, 778 79 (Miss. 1948) (reversing
conviction for assault with intent to kill where defendant conditioning his intent to kill on an
arresting police officer moving toward him failed to establish intent to kill); State v. Irwin, 285
S.E.2d 345, 349 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing conviction for assault with intent to kill,
where defendant threatened to kill prison guard if he was not allowed to escape, because
defendant's conditional intent to kill only established an "intent to intimidate"); State v.
Kinnemore, 295 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (reversing conviction for assault with
intent to kill where defendant threatening to kill victim if he was not allowed to leave a crime
scene only established intent to escape).
179. See, e.g., Stroud v. State, 95 So. 738, 738 (Miss. 1923) ("[I]t is the conditional threat,
whether such condition is right or wrong, that relieves the assaulter of the intent to kill .... "); id.
(reasoning that conditional intent fails to suffice as actual intent because "the intent is conditioned
upon some other event which may not happen").
180. See, e.g., People v. Vandelinder, 481 N.W.2d 787, 789 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming conviction for solicitation for murder where defendant conditioned his intent to kill on
his estranged wife's refusing to comply with an unlawful demand that she reconcile with him);
Thompson v. State, 36 S.W. 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (upholding conviction for assault
with intent to murder where defendant conditioned his intent to kill on a prison guard's noncompliance with an "unlawful demand").
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in People v. Connors,'8 ' regarded as "the leading case" holding that
conditional intent sometimes suffices as actual intent, 8 2 reasoned that a
defendant should not be able to benefit from combining the intent to kill with
an "unlawful condition or demand."' 83 The court found that "the unlawful
character of the demand eliminates it from consideration and the act will be
judged in its naked criminality."' 84 Third, when intent is conditioned on a
threatened victim complying with an entirely lawful demand imposed by the
defendant, conditional intent fails to suffice as actual intent.'85
Considering all four approaches, including the Code's formulation, intent
conditioned on unlawful conduct will likely constitute actual intent under
three of the four approaches. But intent conditioned on entirely lawful
conduct will not constitute actual intent under any of the approaches.' 86 There
appears to be no case holding that intent conditioned on entirely lawful
conduct suffices as actual intent.
Because justified conduct is lawful conduct, 18 7 contrivers' intent to engage
in conduct on the condition that the conduct is justified fails to suffice as
actual intent. Such conditional intent fails to constitute the requisite mens rea
of intent under any of the four approaches to the conditional intent doctrine.
As a result, the conditional intent doctrine has significant implications for
contrived justification defenses, as the next Part explores.

III.

CONDITIONAL INTENT 1N DEFENSE-CONTRIVING

This Part reveals how conditional intent is a powerful tool for analyzing
the Theoretical approach to contrived defenses. It first explains the relevance

181. 97 N.E. 643, 645 49 (111. 1912) (upholding defendants' conviction for assault with intent
to murder where, in a union dispute, defendants threatened to kill employees if they continued
working).
182. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 10 (1999); Chris Norborg, Note, Conditional
Intent to Kill Is Enough for FederalCarjackingConviction, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985,

986 (2000) ("Although it was decided almost ninety years ago, the leading case for the proposition
that conditional intent is sufficient remains the Supreme Court of Illinois' People v. Connors."
(footnote omitted)).
183. Connors, 97 N.E. at 648.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689, 693 94 (1877) (reversing conviction for
assault with intent to murder where defendant conditioned intent to kill on victim's noncompliance with a lawful demand); id. at 694 ("[An intent to kill] must be actual, not conditional,
and especially not conditioned upon non-compliance with a proper demand.").
186. For an explanation of the possible basis for the unlawful/lawful demand distinction as
determining whether a conditional intent suffices as actual intent, see Connors, 97 N.E. at 648.
187. See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 28.
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of the conditional intent doctrine to the Theoretical approach. Second, it
presents and resolves, through application of the doctrine, what some term
the most fundamental objection to the Theoretical approach' 88 as well as a
number of related puzzles. Third, in light of the doctrine, this Part
demonstrates that the Theoretical approach simply does not work-it cannot
both grant contrivers a justification defense and hold them criminally liable.
Fourth, this Part delineates the scope of the conditional intent doctrine's
application to the Theoretical approach by considering various types of mens
rea, offenses, and defenses. Finally, it anticipates and rebuts two possible
objections to this Part's argument that the Theoretical approach fails to hold
contrivers of justification defenses liable.
A. Relevance of ConditionalIntent to TheoreticalApproach
The conditional intent doctrine not only allows for but also requires
bridging what the Theoretical approach maintains is separate and
independent. The Theoretical approach temporally divides the contriver's
conduct into two separate and completely independent stages. 8 9 As separate
and independent, contrived defenses granted at the later stage are unavailable
to exculpate the criminal liability imposed at the earlier, defense-contriving
stage. The conditional intent doctrine, however, spans both stages. While the
assessment of an unconditional intent at TI can be complete without
considering the time period of T2, the assessment of a conditional intentconditioned on something at T2-cannot be cabined to TI but must
necessarily include T2.19' Because the conditional intent doctrine requires an
assessment of the nature of the condition, 191 the doctrine requires an
assessment of the T2 stage. This affords the possibility that the defense
granted at T2 informs the assessment of the TI stage. That is, the defense
granted at the later stage might also have some exculpatory effect on the
earlier stage. If negating the harm or evil of the offense, the defense precludes
a contriver's conditional intent from sufficing as the requisite intent under the
conditional intent doctrine. 192 That a contriver's conditional intent does not
satisfy the requisite mens rea of intent resolves some existing problems of, as
188. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 44, at 479 ("A conditional intent is the intention
that one's conduct will be governed by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a future event."
(emphasis added)).
191. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
192. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
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well as creates new ones for, the Theoretical approach. The next section
utilizes the conditional intent doctrine to resolve some objections to and
puzzles of the Theoretical approach.
B. Solving Puzzles of TheoreticalApproach
In addition to defense-contrivers failing to satisfy requisite elements of
criminal liability, as discussed above, 193 the other principal basis for criticism
of the Theoretical approach is that it incurs conceptual puzzles and reaches
absurd results. Finkelstein and Katz pose the following hypothetical that
forms the basis for what they identify as "the most crucial of all the
objections.' 94 Suppose an actor "goes into a shop, sees a painting he hates,
buys it, and destroys it. Has he committed the crime of destroying the
property of another? No, of course not."' 195 But Finkelstein and Katz argue
that under the Theoretical approach he has committed the crime. 196 At T 1,he
intends to destroy the property of another by contriving the defense of the
property being his own by (later) purchasing it. 197 At T2, after purchasing the
painting, the contriver destroys it. According to the Theoretical approach, that
the conduct at T2 is lawful does not preclude liability for the earlier contriving
conduct at TI.198 At TI, the contriver has the requisite mens rea of intent to
destroy property (which at that time is the property of another). With that
intent, he commits the voluntary act of purchasing that property which
inaugurates a chain of events causing and resulting in the property's
destruction. Based solely on the contriver's conduct at TI, he satisfies the
requisite elements of the crime of destroying the property of another. That he
would have a defense of the property being his own at the T2 stage is
inapplicable to the TI conduct. As a result, the Theoretical approach would
absurdly impose criminal liability on the painting-hater for the offense of
destroying the property of another. Finkelstein and Katz conclude that the
scope of the Theoretical approach needs, but lacks, some limitation'99 to avoid
the approach's absurd application. 0 0
193. See discussion supra Part I.C.
194. Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See id. They also refer to the defense as "consent." Id.
198. See supra notes 17, 96, 98 and accompanying text.
199. See Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488 (maintaining that the doctrine "must be
limited to certain kinds of scenarios").
200. Id. Kim Ferzan suggests a limitation that she illustrates through the following
hypotheticals. Ferzan, supra note 18, at 618 19. May "Carl... apply for a job as an executioner
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The conditional intent doctrine provides a solution.2"' The Theoretical
approach maintains that the painting-hater, at TI, has the requisite mens rea
of intent to destroy the property of another. But does he truly have such
intent? He will not destroy the painting if he does not own it. His intent is
conditioned on (i) the painting being available for purchase, (ii) the price of
the painting not exceeding the value to him of destroying it, (iii) his having
sufficient money to buy the painting, and, more generally, (iv) the painting
being in his actual and legal possession before he destroys it. Because his
intent to destroy property is conditioned on owning that property, his intent
is conditioned on destroying the property justifiably and lawfully. Lawful
conduct-destroying one's own property-is not a legally cognizable harm
because he wants to justifiably kill people"? Id. at 618. May "Debbie [apply for a job as an
ambulance driver] ...because she wants to justifiably speed through red lights"? Id. That is, are
Carl and Debbie intentionally contriving a defense at T1 for conduct each will, at T2,justifiably
commit? The logic of the Theoretical approach might suggest that each are liable for a crime
because at T1 they lack a justification for their intending to kill and speed, respectively. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text. But Ferzan argues that they should not be liable because "they
do not engage in conduct in order to create those very f[ustificatory] circumstances." Ferzan,
supra note 18, at 619. Carl is not creating or manufacturing opportunities to execute capital
offenders and Debbie is not creating or manufacturing opportunities to speed.
While Ferzan's limitation on the scope of the Theoretical approach prevents it from reaching
absurd results in the above examples, the limitation may still not be sufficient. It fails to prevent
the approach from reaching an absurd result in Finkelstein and Katz's example. See supra text
accompanying notes 194 200. In Ferzan's examples, neither Carl nor Debbie engages in conduct
that creates their exculpatory circumstances. See Ferzan, supra note 18, at 619. Neither Carl nor
Debbie is increasing the supply of capital defendants to be executed or sick people needing to be
rushed to the hospital, respectively. Carl and Debbie are content to wait for persons warranting
execution and requiring to be sped to a hospital, respectively. But the painting-hater is not content
to merely destroy property that he already owns. The actor is creating or manufacturing
opportunities to destroy property justifiably. By the act of purchasing the painting, the actor is, in
Ferzan's terms, "engag[ing] in conduct in order to create those very fjustificatory]
circumstances." Id.As a result, Ferzan's limitation would not preclude the Theoretical approach
from reaching the absurd result of imposing liability on the painting-hater.
201. It also provides a solution to Ferzan's examples. See supra note 200 and accompanying
text. Under the Theoretical approach, at T1 both Carl and Debbie have the intent to kill and speed,
respectively. But do Carl and Debbie truly have such intents? If there is no one whom the state
has authorized as ready for execution and there is no one who needs to be rushed to the hospital,
then Carl will not kill anyone and Debbie will not speed. Carl will only kill and Debbie will only
speed on the condition that doing so is authorized by law or justified. Thus, Carl and Debbie do
not have the simple intent to kill and speed, respectively. Rather, Carl and Debbie have a
conditional intent to kill and speed, respectively. Both intents are conditioned on the justifiability
and lawfulness of their conduct. That condition negates the harm or evil of murder and speeding.
See infra text accompanying notes 202 203. Lawful and justified conduct is not a legally
cognizable harm or evil. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. Their conditional intent does
not suffice as the requisite actual intent. Lacking the requisite mens rea, they cannot be held
criminally liable.
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or evil.2" 2 The condition negates the harm and evil that the offense of
destruction of the property of another seeks to prevent. Under the conditional
intent doctrine, the actor's conditional intent does not suffice as actual
intent.2" 3 Unable to establish the requisite mens rea of intent for the offense,
the Theoretical approach cannot hold the painting-hater liable for destruction
of the property of another. The conditional intent doctrine dispels the
absurdity.
If Finkelstein and Katz's example is thought to be a narrow outlier easily
dismissed, the following example is significantly broader." 4 Consider what
each and every one of us does when we visit a grocery store. We buy food
that we plan to consume and thus destroy. Is each and every one of us
criminally liable for the destruction of property each and every time we shop
for groceries? Under the logic of the Theoretical approach we are.20 5 At TI,
we intend to destroy the property of another (the grocery store's) under the
exculpatory circumstances of the property being our own at the time of
destruction of the property (at T2). With that intent we commit the voluntary
act of placing the property in our shopping carts that inaugurates a chain of
events causing the destruction of the property. At T2, we do consume and
thus destroy the property under circumstances that are exculpatory. But we
are liable for our contriving conduct at TI because the defense that is
available at T2 is not available at TI. That each and every one of us is
criminally liable for the destruction of property of another each and every
time we go to the grocery store is surely absurd. Yet that is the logic of the
Theoretical approach.
202. For the view that lawful conduct constitutes neither a legally cognizable harm nor evil,
see McMillan v. City of Jackson, 701 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Miss. 1997) (ruling necessity defense
inapplicable to offense of trespass at abortion clinic for the purpose of preventing abortions
because abortion "is not a legally recognized harm"); State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 193
(N.D. 1991) (ruling the same because "a lawful abortion is not a legally cognizable evil").
203. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
204. Katz offers another example of conduct that nearly all of us commit for which the
Theoretical approach would impose liability. "According to the logic of the reigning view [of the
contrived-defense doctrine], the person who cashes a check in a bank should be guilty of bank
robbery because he removed money under what he contrived to be exculpatory conditions." Katz,
supra note 17, at 594. That is, at T1, the actor intends to obtain money from a bank under
conditions in which she cannot be held liable for theft. With the intent to obtain money from a
bank, she creates the exculpatory circumstances by opening an account and depositing money. At
T2, the actor withdraws money from the bank by cashing a check against her account. Though
not criminally liable for theft from the bank based on her T2 conduct, she is criminally liable
based on her T1 conduct when she intentionally created the circumstances of her own defense
without a defense for that conduct. Of course, that the Theoretical approach would impose liability
for theft in that example is absurd.
205. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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The conditional intent doctrine again solves the puzzle. When we go to the
grocery store, we do not merely have the intent to consume and thus destroy
the property of another (the grocery store's property). Rather, we have a
conditional intent to consume (and thus destroy) the property of anotherconditioned on our lawful ownership of the food or other items. And that
condition-lawful ownership of the property to be destroyed-negates the
harm or evil that the offense seeks to prevent. Because the condition negates
the harm or evil, our conditional intent fails to suffice as actual intent under
the conditional intent doctrine.2"6 Lacking the requisite intent precludes our
liability under the Theoretical approach. Application of the conditional intent
doctrine avoids the absurd result reached by the Theoretical approach.
The broadest puzzle generated by the Theoretical approach applies to any
contrived justification defense. Consider again the example of Able who
intends to kill Baker if and only if doing so constitutes justified self-defense.
With that intent, at TI, Able taunts Baker into unlawfully aggressing and
Able kills Baker at T2. The Theoretical approach grants the contrived
justified self-defense at T2 but imposes liability for murder based on the
defense-contriving conduct-the taunting at TI.2o The Theoretical approach
incurs the following puzzle: how or why does coupling an intent to act
justifiably and lawfully with an independently lawful act (taunting) that
causes a justified and lawful result (the death of unlawful aggressor Baker)
combine to create criminal liability (the murder of Baker)?
The conditional intent doctrine again solves the puzzle. At TI, Able's
intent to kill Baker is conditioned on the occurrence of the future event at T2
that the killing is justified self-defense. The Theoretical approach grants the
contrived justification defense at T2. Justified and lawful conduct is not a
legally cognizable harm or evil.2 8 Killing justifiably and lawfully negates the
harm or evil of murder. Because the condition negates murder's harm or evil,
Able's conditional intent does not suffice as actual intent under the
conditional intent doctrine. 2 9 Lacking the requisite mens rea of intent, Able
is not liable for intentional murder. That solves the puzzle incurred by the
Theoretical approach. That the intent to act justifiably (lawfully) coupled
with an independently lawful act that causes a justified (lawful) result

206.
207.
208.
209.

See discussion supra Part II.B C.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.B C.
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combine to not create criminal liability for murder is neither absurd nor
puzzling.210
Application of the conditional intent doctrine resolves "the most crucial of
all the objections" 211 to the Theoretical approach and other related puzzles
and absurd results. The painting-hater has no criminal liability for destroying
a painting after he purchases it. None of us have criminal liability for
intending to destroy (consume) food after we have purchased it from the
grocer. And an intent to act justifiably (lawfully) coupled with an
independently lawful act that causes a justifiable (lawful) result no longer
puzzlingly results in criminal liability. While the conditional intent doctrine
resolves these objections to the Theoretical approach, the next section
demonstrates the doctrine also exposes new problems.

C. ConditionalIntent in ContrivedJustificationDefenses
Application of the conditional intent doctrine reveals that the Theoretical
approach simply does not work regarding an entire class of defensesjustification. Contrivers of justification defenses condition their intent to
commit conduct on the justifiability of their conduct. The Theoretical
approach grants such contrivers their justification defense. Because justified
conduct is lawful conduct,2 1 2 contrivers of justification defenses condition
their intent to commit conduct on the lawfulness of their conduct. Under the
influential Model Penal Code formulation, conditional intent suffices as
actual intent unless the condition negates the harm or evil the offense seeks
21 4
to prohibit.2 3 Lawful conduct is not a legally cognizable harm or evil.

210. The puzzle does not arise under the Legal approach. For example, the Model Penal Code
bars lethal force from qualifying as justified self-defense if the actor provoked the victim's
aggression "with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04(2)(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Able provoked with this purpose, is unjustified in selfdefense, and is criminally liable for murder. By barring his justification, the Legal approach
regards Able as intending to act in a way that is unjustified and unlawful. That the intent to act in
a way that the criminal law regards as unjustified and unlawful coupled with an independently
lawful act that causes an unjustified, unlawful result combine to create criminal liability for
murder is hardly absurd or puzzling.
Application of the conditional intent doctrine would have no effect. Because the Legal
approach assesses Able's mens rea at the time that Able employs self-defense force (rather than
at the time of the provocation), Able has no conditional intent at T2. Able's intent to use force is
not conditioned on the occurrence of any future event.
211. See Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 488.
212. See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 28.
213. See discussion supra Part I.B.
214. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, conditioning intent to commit conduct on its lawfulness surely
negates the harm or evil that criminal offenses seek to prevent. Under nonModel Penal Code formulations of the conditional intent doctrine, conditional
intent does not suffice as actual intent when the actor conditions intent on
lawful conduct of the actor.215 As a result, under the Theoretical approach, the
conditional intent of contrivers of justification defenses fails to suffice as
actual intent under all formulations of the conditional intent doctrine. Unable
to establish the requisite mens rea of intent, the Theoretical approach cannot
hold contrivers of justification defenses criminally liable.
Consider again the example of Able and Baker. At TI, Able induces Baker
to unlawfully aggress with the conditional intent to kill Baker if and only if
doing so is justified self-defense at T2. The Theoretical approach grants
Able's justification defense for killing Baker at T2. Because Able's conduct
is justified, it is lawful; lawful conduct is not a legally cognizable harm or
evil. Conditioning killing on its lawfulness negates the harm or evil murder
seeks to prevent. Under the conditional intent doctrine, Able's conditional
intent fails to suffice as actual intent. Able lacks the requisite mens rea of
intent at the defense-contriving stage (TI). As a result, the Theoretical
approach cannot hold Able liable for the offense of intentional murder for
contriving the defense (at TI). Granting Able's contrived justification
defense for killing Baker (at T2) blocks the Theoretical approach's ability to
establish Able's liability (at TI) for contriving the defense.216
The Legal approach does not share the Theoretical approach's difficulty.
Application of the conditional intent doctrine has little impact on the Legal
approach for two reasons. First, while Able's intent to kill is conditional at
TI, the Legal approach need not base liability on the earlier TI conduct.
Instead, it may base liability on the later T2 conduct (because it disallows a
defense for the T2 conduct). 2' At T2, Able's intent to kill is no longer
conditional-Baker is presently unlawfully aggressing against Able. At T2,
Able satisfies the elements of murder-intentionally causing the death of
another. 28 Barring Able's contrived defense, the Legal approach successfully
holds Able liable for murder. Second, even if Able's intent to kill Baker at
215. See discussion supra Part I.C.
216. That many state homicide statutes explicitly include as a requisite offense element that
the killing be unlawful or unjustified, see infra notes 259 63 and accompanying text, further
supports the condition negating the harm or evil that the offense seeks to prevent. Such homicide
statutes are explicitly stating that the harm or evil that homicide statutes seek to prevent are not
killings per se but unjustified or unlawful killings. That a defense-contriver conditions her intent
to kill on the killing being justified and lawful would clearly negate the explicit element that the
killing be unlawful or unjustified.
217. See discussion supra Part I.A.
218. See supra notes 22, 153.
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T2 was somehow conditional, the condition fails to negate the harm or evil
murder seeks to prevent. Ineligible for self-defense, Able's killing Baker is
unjustified and unlawful. Unjustified and unlawful killing fails to negate the
harm or evil murder seeks to prevent. Therefore, Able's conditional intent
suffices as actual intent and satisfies the requisite mens rea for murder
liability. Regardless of whether Able's intent is conditional or not, Able's
intent suffices as the requisite actual intent thereby allowing the Legal
approach to find Able liable.
The Theoretical approach's difficulty extends beyond self-defense to any
justification defense. Consider again Robinson's example involving the
justification defense of necessity: "Assume that an actor sets a fire that
threatens a nearby town to create the conditions that will justify his using his
enemy's farm as a firebreak. 21 9 The Theoretical approach grants the
contrived necessity defense for setting fire to the enemy's farm at T2. 220 But
it maintains that the actor is liable for destroying the enemy's farm based on
his defense-contriving at T I: with the intent of destroying the enemy's farm,
the actor commits the voluntary act of setting a fire that threatens a town, and
that act is the cause of the destruction of the enemy's farm.2 2'
At TI, however, does the actor merely have intent or instead conditional
intent? At TI, the actor's intent is conditioned on the occurrence of future
events: (i) the fire will not die out by itself, (ii) someone else does not put out
the fire, (iii) the winds do not shift so that the fire no longer threatens the
town, and more generally, and (iv) the circumstances and conditions are such
that the actor will receive the necessity defense for setting fire to the enemy's
farmhouse. If any of these conditions do not apply, then the actor will not set
fire to the enemy's farm. Therefore, the actor does not merely have intent;
the actor has conditional intent.
Conditional intent triggers application of the conditional intent doctrine.
The doctrine looks to the nature of the condition placed on the intent.222 The
Theoretical approach grants the contrived justification defense.22 3 Justified
conduct is lawful conduct. 224 Lawful conduct is not a legally cognizable harm
or evil. 225 Under the conditional intent doctrine, conditioning intent to commit
conduct on its lawfulness negates the harm or evil that criminal offenses seek

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Robinson, supra note 8, at 28.
See id. at 31.
See id.
See discussion supra Part II.B C.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 28.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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to prevent.22 6 The actor's conditional intent thus does not suffice as actual
intent. Unable to establish the requisite mens rea of intent at TI, the
Theoretical approach cannot hold the actor liable for her defense-contriving
conduct at TI. In contrast, the Legal approach successfully holds the actor
liable because her contrived defense and the conditional intent doctrine are
inapplicable.22
To summarize, application of the conditional intent doctrine demonstrates
that the Theoretical approach does not work with respect to contrived
justification defenses.228 It fails to hold contrivers of justification defenses
criminally liable. By granting contrived justification defenses, the
Theoretical approach is unable to impose liability for the defense-contriving
conduct. In contrast, the conditional intent doctrine has little impact on the
226. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
227. See discussion supra Part I.A and note 210 and accompanying text.
228. The same problem demonstrated to arise under the reigning version of the Theoretical
approach the traditional, causal account-also arises under the principal, alternative version of
the Theoretical approach, the perpetration-by-means account. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text. Larry Alexander illustrates this latter account by drawing on and modifying
a scene from the film Shane, in which the actor Jack Palance, playing the gun-slinging villain,
contrives to kill a good-guy farmer under circumstances of self-defense. Alexander, supranote 9,
at 625 (citing SHANE (Paramount Pictures 1953)). For a longer exposition of the narrative of the
film, see Ferzan, supra note 18, at 619. Alexander imagines that there are two Palances Palance
1 who provokes ("Early Self') and Palance 2 who kills in self-defense ("Later Self'). Alexander,
supranote 9, at 628. "Palance 1 tells the farmer that Palance 2 has called the farmer 'Confederate
scum.' The farmer sets out to shoot Palance 2, but Palance 2 is quicker on the draw and kills the
farmer, which Palance 1 hoped would happen." Id. Alexander concludes that the justifiability of
Palance 2's killing of the farmer, a culpable aggressor, does not foreclose liability for Palance 1
for the farmer's death. Id.
Application of the conditional intent doctrine demonstrates that granting a justification
defense to Palance 2 precludes Palance 1 from liability for the farmer's murder. Palance 1 does
not merely have the intent to kill the farmer. Palance l's intent is conditioned on the following
future events: (i) the farmer being provoked, (ii) the farmer unlawfully aggressing against and
attempting to kill Palance 2, and more generally, (iii) Palance 2 kills the farmer in justified selfdefense. (As alter egos of the same self, Palance 1 only intends Palance 2 to kill the farmer if
doing so is justified and Palance 2 will only kill the farmer if doing is justified.) As a result,
Palance 1 has conditional intent. The condition that Palance 2 is able to kill the farmer in
justified self-defense-negates the harm and evil that the offense of murder seeks to prevent under
the conditional intent doctrine. See supra notes 202 03 and accompanying text. Justified killing
is lawful killing and lawful conduct is not a legally cognizable harm or evil. See supra notes 27,
202 and accompanying text. Therefore, Palance l's conditional intent does not suffice as the intent
satisfying the requisite mens rea of murder. As a result, Palance 1 is not liable for intentional
murder. Granting a justification defense to Palance 2 precludes holding Palance 1 liable. For a
different argument as to why the perpetration-by-means account cannot hold a contriver of a
justification defense liable, see Finkelstein & Katz, supra note 10, at 489 n.40 (arguing that
accomplices (an Early Self or Palance 1) generally share in the justification defenses of principals
(a Later Self or Palance 2)); Katz, supra note 17, at 594 95 (contending that the perpetration-bymeans account may fail to hold contrivers of justified self-defense criminally liable).
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Legal approach. By barring contrived justification defenses, the Legal
approach successfully imposes liability. To the extent that such contrivers
deserve liability-a nearly universal intuition and one embraced by both
approaches-the Legal approach gets it right and the Theoretical approach
gets it wrong.
D. Scope of TheoreticalApproach's Failureto Hold DefenseContrivers Liable
This section delineates the extent of the Theoretical approach's failure to
hold defense-contrivers criminally liable. First, while the conditional intent
doctrine precludes contrivers of justification defenses from liability for
offenses requiring the mens rea of purpose or intention, simply the
conditional nature of such contrivers' plans precludes liability for offenses
requiring the mens rea of knowledge. Second, that such contrivers lack
purpose and intention forecloses attempt liability. Third, the conditional
nature of the plans of contrivers of excuse defenses prevents liability for
offenses requiring knowledge. Fourth, the above difficulties for the
Theoretical approach apply only to paradigmatic contrivers who will commit
the offense if and only if a defense applies.

1.

Justification Defenses and Mens Rea

Contrivers of justification defenses may lack the mens rea of knowledge.
While the conditional intent doctrine precludes purpose and intention, the
conditional nature of such contrivers' plans (apart from the doctrine) may
preclude satisfaction of knowledge. Because contrivers condition their
planned conduct on future events that are uncertain to occur, contrivers may
lack knowledge as to that future conduct. Consider again our example of Able
and Baker. At TI, Able taunts Baker with the intent to kill Baker on
satisfaction of the conditions (at T2) that (i) Baker does unlawfully attack
him, (ii) Baker uses lethal force, and, more generally, (iii) Able killing Baker
constitutes justified self-defense. The Model Penal Code defines knowledge
with respect to a result crime like homicide as the actor being "practically
certain that his conduct will cause such result. '229 For Able to be practically
certain that his taunting at TI will cause Baker's death, Able would have to
be practically certain that all three above conditions would apply. Because
there's no particular reason why Able would be practically certain that even
229.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii)

(AM. LAW INST.

1985).
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condition (1)will apply, Able would be even less practically certain that all
three conditions will apply. Therefore, Able fails to satisfy a mens rea of
knowledge as to the result element of the death of Baker.23 As a result, the
Theoretical approach fails to hold contrivers of justification defenses liable
for offenses requiring knowledge."'
The conditional intent doctrine and the conditional nature of contrivers'
plans prevents the Theoretical approach from establishing only some, but not
all, types of mens rea. As discussed above, the Theoretical approach is unable
to impose liability for offenses requiring mens rea of purpose, intention, or
knowledge. But neither the conditional intent doctrine nor the conditional
nature of contrivers' plans forecloses contrivers ofjustification defenses from
satisfying mens rea of recklessness or negligence.232 As a result, the
Theoretical approach may well succeed in holding such contrivers liable for
offenses requiring those lesser mens rea.

230. At T2, while Baker is unlawfully aggressing against him, Able might well have practical
certainty that he will kill Baker. But at T2, the Theoretical approach grants Able a justification
defense. As such, the Theoretical approach is limited to establishing mens rea at T1. But at T1,
Able still lacks practical certainty that he will kill Baker because the three conditions have not yet
been satisfied.
231. The Legal approach does not share the Theoretical approach's difficulty. While Able
would lack knowledge at T1 as to Baker's death, the Legal approach need not base Able's liability
on T1 conduct. Instead, it could base Able's liability on his T2 conduct. At T2, because all of the
conditions apply, Able is practically certain as to Baker's death, thereby satisfying the mens rea
of knowledge (as well as intention). Therefore, unlike the Theoretical approach, the Legal
approach successfully holds contrivers ofjustification defenses liable for offenses requiring mens
rea of knowledge.
232. For example, Able would satisfy a mens rea of recklessness or negligence. The Model
Penal Code defines recklessness, in part, as when an actor "consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustified risk." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). The Code similarly
defines negligence as when an actor "should be aware of a substantial and unjustified risk." Id.
§ 2.02(2)(d). By taunting or provoking Baker, Able both consciously disregards and should have
been aware of the risk that Able might kill Baker. Though the uncertainty of the conditions arising
precludes Able's practical certainty that Baker would attack and he would kill Baker, the
uncertainty of the conditions probably do not preclude that the risk is substantial. But is the risk
unjustified? Though justified at T2 when Able kills Baker, the risk was unjustified at T1. Here,
the Theoretical approach's claim that the justification at T2 has no relevance to assessing the
actor's conduct at T1 holds true. While the conditional intent doctrine made relevant the
justification at T2 in assessing the actor's conditional intent at T 1, the conditional intent doctrine
does not apply to recklessness and negligence. As a result, the Theoretical approach is able to
hold Able liable for homicide based on the mens rea of recklessness or negligence.
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Justification Defenses and Attempts

The Theoretical approach maintains that it imposes attempt liability on
defense-contrivers who fail to commit the target offense for which they
contrived a defense.23 3 Consider again the example of Able and Baker. At TI,
with the intent of killing Baker in justified self-defense, Able commits an
act-taunting Baker-that would be the cause of death of Baker if Baker does
unlawfully aggress against Able and if Able does then kill Baker. But suppose
that Able does not kill Baker-because either Able tries to do so but fails or
Baker does not unlawfully aggress against Able and Able declines to kill in
the absence ofjustificatory circumstances. Based solely on Able's conduct at
TI, the Theoretical approach would hold Able liable for an attempt.
Application of the conditional intent doctrine, however, precludes the
Theoretical approach from imposing attempt liability on contrivers of
justification defenses in most jurisdictions. Under the majority rule, the
requisite mens rea for attempt is specific intent;2 34 under the Model Penal
Code, the requisite intent is purpose (for a result crime like homicide). 2 At
TI, Able has a conditional intent and the condition-justifiably and lawfully
killing Baker-negates the harm or evil that the offense seeks to prohibit.
233. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 13, § 8.0.3, at 295 ("Another useful characteristic
of this approach is that where the ultimate offense is never committed, the defendant may
nonetheless be liable for an attempt to commit the offense."); Robinson, supra note 8, at 34 n. 122
(same).
234. E.g., DRESSLER, supranote 3, § 27.05, at 384 ("[A]n attempt is a specific-intent offense,
even if the target offense is a general intent crime." (emphasis omitted)); KADISH ET AL., supra
note 138, at 613 ("Both the common law and most American statutory formulations agree ... that
an attempt requires a purpose (or 'specific intent') to produce the proscribed result, even when
recklessness or some lesser mens rea would suffice for conviction of the completed offense.");
see, e.g., ROBINSON & CAHILL, supranote 13, § 11.2, at 455 ("At Common Law, attempt was said
to be 'specific intent offense,' requiring a higher level of culpability than a 'general intent
offense,' for which the actor's intention could be assumed from his conduct.").
235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985). Robinson and Cahill
explain the Code's somewhat convoluted approach as follows:
The Model Penal Code's commentary explains that it generally seeks to follow
the common-law rule for attempt, elevating the culpability required for a result
element. "The general principle is ... that the actor must affirmatively
desire ... to cause the result that will constitute the principal offense." This is
said to follow from the Common Law's rule that attempt is a specific intent
offense. In this respect, the Code's drafters appear to adopt the broad
interpretation of (1)'s "purpose" language .... The drafters fear that punishing
cases where an actor recklessly or negligently disregards a possible result, but
where the result does not occur, would unduly extend criminal liability.
ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 13, § 11.2, at 458 (footnotes omitted) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2, at 301(AM. LAW. INST. 1985)).
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Therefore, Able's conditional intent does not suffice as the requisite specific
intent or purpose. 36 While the conditional intent doctrine does not preclude
Able from satisfying the lesser mens rea standards of recklessness and
negligence, 3 these lesser mens rea fail to suffice for attempt liability under
the majority rule. As a result, the Theoretical approach is unable to hold
contrivers of justification defenses liable for an attempt in most jurisdictions.
3.

Excuse Defenses and Mens Rea

In addition to offenses with mens rea of recklessness or negligence,
application of the conditional intent doctrine creates no problems for the
Theoretical approach's treatment of contrived excuse defenses. Consider the
following example:
Suppose Frank knows that the Mob wants to kill Frida .... Frank
also wants to kill Frida... [but] fears being convicted for her
killing. So Frank goes to the headquarters of the Mob, hoping they
will threaten him with death unless he ... kills her. They in fact so
threaten him, and he does what they have coerced him to do. When
charged with Frida's murder, he pleads duress.238
Duress applies where an actor has been coerced by threats of unlawful
force that a reasonable person would have been unable to resist. 239 Frank
conditions his intent to kill Frida on the presence of circumstances supporting
the excuse defense of duress.24u Unlike conditioning intent on the existence
ofjustificatory circumstances, conditioning intent to commit offenses on the
existence of excusatory circumstances does not negate the harm or evil that
offenses seek to prevent. While justified conduct is permissible and lawful, 4'
excused conduct is wrongful and unlawful.242 Because of the wrongful and
236. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
238. Alexander, supra note 9, at 625.
239. For the Model Penal Code's provision on duress, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1)
(AM. LAw INST. 1985).
240. See id. § 2.09 (placing the duress provision in Article 2, General Principles of Liability,
rather than in Article 3, General Principles of Justification); Dressler, supra note 75, at 1349 67
(treating duress as an excuse).
241. See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 28.
242. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 16.04, at 205 (terming excused conduct as
"wrongful, intolerable, and censurable"); FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 759 ("[C]laims of excuse
concede that the act is wrongful."); ROBINSON & CAHILL, supranote 13, § 8.0.1, at 284 ("Excuses
apply to actors who have caused a net societal harm or evil."); Mitchell Berman, Justificationand
Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2003) ("[A]n excused defendant has committed a
crime .... ).
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unlawful nature of excused conduct, Frank's condition fails to negate the
harm or evil of murder under the conditional intent doctrine. 243 As a result,
Frank's conditional intent to kill does suffice as actual intent. Granting Frank
his contrived excuse defense of duress does not preclude the Theoretical
approach from establishing the requisite mens rea at the defense-contriving
stage. Establishing Frank's mens rea of intention, the Theoretical approach
successfully holds Frank liable for the intentional murder of Frida.
Though the conditional intent doctrine fails to impact the Theoretical
approach's treatment of contrived excuse defenses, simply the conditional
nature of contrivers' plans may preclude contrivers of excuse defenses from
satisfying the mens rea of knowledge. Consider a modified version of the
above example making explicit what is merely implicit. Frank's plan is
conditional: Frank will kill Frida if and only if (i) the mob coerces him, and,
more generally, (ii) the circumstances and requirements for a successful
duress defense pertain. The Model Penal Code defines knowledge with
respect to a result crime (including homicide) as "practically certain that his
conduct will cause such result. '244 Is Frank practically certain (at the defensecontriving stage) that his conduct of going to the Mob headquarters will cause
Frida's death? Because his plan is conditional, he may not be practically
certain that conditions (i) and (ii) will occur, and thus not be practically
certain at the defense-contriving stage that he will subsequently kill Frida. As
a result, Frank may fail to satisfy the mens rea of knowledge. The Theoretical
approach may be unable to hold contrivers of either type of defensejustification or excuse-liable for an offense requiring a mens rea of
knowledge.
4.

Conditional and Unconditional Defense-Contriving

While the paradigmatic defense-contriver commits the crime if and only
if a defense applies, some defense-contrivers might hope a defense will apply
but will commit the crime even in the absence of a defense. 245 The former
might be termed conditional defense-contrivers and the latter unconditional
defense-contrivers. For example, contriving to kill Baker in justified selfdefense, Able will kill Baker if and only if Able satisfies the requirements for
the defense. Contrast that with Able 2 who hopes to kill Baker 2 in justified
self-defense but Able 2 will kill Baker 2 even if the requirements for the
defense are absent. Able is a conditional defense-contriver; Able 2 is an

243. See discussion supra Part II.B C.
244. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
245. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 623.
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unconditional defense-contriver. As discussed above, while the Theoretical
approach is able to hold unconditionaldefense-contrivers criminally liable, it
is unable to hold some conditionaldefense-contrivers criminally liable.
Summing up, the Theoretical approach does not work as to, and fails to
impose criminal liability on, paradigmatic (or conditional) contrivers of:
(i) justification defenses when charged with offenses requiring mens rea of
purpose, intention, or knowledge, (ii) justification defenses when charged
with an attempt (under the majority rule), and (iii) excuse defenses when
charged with offenses requiring knowledge.246
E. Objections
This section anticipates, presents, and rebuts two possible objections to
this Article's central claim that the conditional intent doctrine reveals the
Theoretical approach's inability to establish the requisite mens rea to hold
contrivers of justification defenses liable. First, one might object that
conditioning intent on acting justifiably does not prevent the harm that
offenses seek to prevent and thus such conditional intent does suffice as
actual intent. Second, one might object that conditioning intent on the
presence ofjustification-as extrinsic to offenses' elements-negates neither
the harm nor evil that offenses seek to prevent and thus the conditional intent
of contrivers of justification defenses suffices as actual intent. Neither of
these objections, however, is persuasive.
1.

Condition Fails to Negate Harm of Offense

One might object that the condition that contrivers ofjustification defenses
place on their intention fails to negate the harm of an offense. As such,
contrivers' conditional intent suffices as the requisite intent necessary for
liability. For example, if a murder statute prohibits intentionally causing the
death of another,24 7 then the harm the offense is trying to prevent is
intentionally caused deaths of others. Contrivers killing in justified selfdefense intentionally cause the deaths of others no less than other intentional
murderers. Victims killed by contrivers of justification defenses suffer the
same harm as victims killed by other intentional murderers. Both types of
246. The Theoretical approach does work as to and is able to impose criminal liability on:
(i) contrivers of justification defenses charged with offenses requiring recklessness or negligence,
(ii) such contrivers charged with an attempt in a jurisdiction following the minority rule,
(iii) contrivers of excuse defenses charged with an offense requiring any mens rea except
knowledge, and (iv) non-paradigmatic (or unconditional) defense-contrivers.
247. See supra notes 22, 153.
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victims suffer the equal harm of intentionally caused death. As a result, the
conditional intent of such contrivers suffices as the requisite mens rea for
intentional murder and application of the conditional intent doctrine fails to
expose difficulties for the Theoretical approach.
Even if the premise of the objection is true-that the condition fails to
negate the harm of the offense-the conclusion does not follow that
contrivers' conditional intent suffices as actual intent. The Model Penal Code
formulation states that conditional intent does not suffice for actual intent if
the condition negates either the harm or the evil of the offense.24 8 That is,
even if the condition fails to negate the harm of the offense, the condition
may negate the evil of the offense. The evil that murder or any homicide
offense is designed to prevent is not killing in general but unlawful killing.
Justified killings are lawful; lawful killings are not legally cognizable evils.249
Conditioning a killing on its justifiability and lawfulness does negate the evil
of a homicide offense.25 That the condition negates the evil of an offense
precludes the actor's conditional intent from sufficing as actual intent.2 5'
Unable to establish the requisite mens rea, the Theoretical approach cannot
impose intentional murder liability on contrivers of justification defenses.
Therefore, the objection fails.

2.

Condition Negates Neither Harm nor Evil of Offense

One might object that the condition that contrivers ofjustification defenses
place on their intention negates neither the harm nor the evil of an offense.
The harm and evil that offenses seek to prevent are best understood by their
elements. If the actor satisfies the elements of an offense, then the actor is not
avoiding the offense's harm or evil. Nothing outside of or extrinsic to
offenses' elements have any bearing on offenses' harm and evil. As a result,
justification defenses, as extrinsic to offenses' elements, fail to negate
offenses' harm or evil. Therefore, the conditional intent of contrivers of
justification defenses suffices as actual intent. By establishing the requisite
mens rea, the Theoretical approach successfully holds such contrivers liable.

248.
purpose
added)).
249.
250.
251.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (AM. LAw INST. 1985) (providing that conditional
suffices as actual purpose "unless the condition negatives the harm or evil" (emphasis

See supra notes 27 28, 202 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.B C.
See discussion supra Part II.B C.
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In addition to the previous objection's response-justified and lawful
conduct is not a legally cognizable evi1 25 2-there

are a number of responses

to this objection. First, the Model Penal Code Commentary's paradigmatic
example of a conditional intent negating the harm and evil of an offense
defeats this objection. The Commentary states that "it would not be an assault
with the intent to commit rape, if the defendant's purpose was to accomplish
the sexual relation only if the mature victim consented. ' 253 That is, the actor's
intent to have sexual relations is conditioned on the victim consenting. That
condition negates the harm or evil the offense seeks to prevent. Under the
Code, the victim's non-consent is neither an element of the offense of rape
nor of assault.254 Rather, the Code conceptualizes consent as a defense. 255 As

a result, a condition pertaining to that which is both a non-element and
extrinsic to the offense-a defense-does negate the harm or evil the offense
seeks to prevent. The Commentary's paradigmatic example demonstrates that
conditioning intent on acting under a defense does negate the harm or evil
that the offense seeks to prevent. If a defense that the Code only sometimes
views as a justification 256 negates offenses' harm or evil, then a fortiori
justification defenses clearly negate offenses' harm or evil. Thus, the
Commentary on the Code's influential formulation of the conditional intent
doctrine clearly rejects the objection.
Second, the objection's premise is false. Offenses' elements do not
exclusively embody offenses' harm or evil. Even if technically extrinsic to
offenses' elements,25 justification defenses may also address offenses' harm
or evil. As Kyron Huigens explains, an offense or "crime consists of the
violation of a prohibitory norm. The absence of justification is part of the
prohibitory norm, even though we enact it into law separately from the
offense for the sake of clarity and convenience.

' 258

That is, the absence of a

252. See discussion supra Part III.E. 1.
253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6), cmt. 8, at 247 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985) (emphasis added).
254. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (lacking as an element the
victim's non-consent for an "assault" offense); id. § 213.1 (lacking as an element the victim's
non-consent for "rape and related offenses").
255. See id. § 2.11 (1) ("The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense
or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent ... precludes the infliction of the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.").
256. See id. § 2.11(2) ("When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes
or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense
if... the consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code.").
257. For discussion ofjurisdictions including the absence ofjustification defenses as part of
the elements of offenses, see infra notes 259 263 and accompanying text.
258. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEo L. J. 387, 425 (2002).
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justification defense is implicitly part of or intrinsic to an offense. For
example, even if the elements of a murder statute prohibit intentionally
causing the deaths of others, the prohibitory norm is intentionally causing the
deaths of others unjustifiably or unlawfully. As a result, placing a condition
on the intent to commit conduct-only if the conduct is justified and lawfuldoes negate the harm or evil the offense seeks to prevent.
Third, even if offense elements exclusively embody offenses' harm or
evil, some jurisdictions explicitly include unlawfulness or absence of
justification as offense elements. For example, some jurisdictions' homicide
and murder offenses contain the offense element that the killing is unlawful
or unjustified. Various formulations of this offense element include that the
'260
9
killing is committed "unlawfully,"'2 5 "without the authority of law,
'262
"without lawful justification, "261 or simply that the killing is "unlawful.
259. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(a) (2017) ("A person commits the offense of murder
when he unlawfully.., causes the death of another human being." (emphasis added)); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (2017) ("A person commits murder in the first degree when that person
unlawfully.., causes the death of another human being." (emphasis added)); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-105(a) (2017) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills ....
" (emphasis
added)).
260. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1) (2017) ("The killing of a human being without the
authority of law.., shall be murder .... (emphasis added)); id. § 97-3-19(2) ("The killing of a
human being without the authority of law ...shall be capital murder ....
" (emphasis added));
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2017) ("Homicide is murder in the first degree: (1) If perpetrated
without authority of law ....
" (emphasis added)).
261. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2017) ("The killing of a human being by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawfuljustification... is manslaughter."
(emphasis added)); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a) (2017) ("A person who kills an individual
without lawfuljustificationcommits first degree murder ..." (emphasis added)); id. 5/9-3(a) ("A
person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary
manslaughter .... (emphasis added)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (A) (2017) ("Murder in the first
degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or
excuse .... (emphasis added)); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503(a) (2017) ("A person who kills an
individual without lawfuljustification commits voluntary manslaughter .... (emphasis added));
id. § 2507(c)(1) ("[A person commits manslaughter of a law enforcement officer in the first
degree if the person] without lawful justification kills a law enforcement officer .. " (emphasis
added)).
262. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §187(a) (West 2017) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." (emphasis added)); id. § 192 ("Manslaughter
is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." (emphasis added)); FLA. STAT.
§ 782.04(1)(a) (2017) ("The unlawful killing of a human being... [is murder]." (emphasis
added)); IDAHO CODE § 18-4001 (2017) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being .. " (emphasis added)); id. § 18-4006 ("Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human
being...." (emphasis added)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.040 (2017) ("Manslaughter is the
unlawful killing of a human being...." (emphasis added)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (2017)
("Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." (emphasis added));
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1 (2017) ("The unlawful killing of a human being with malice

49:1141]

EXCULPATION AS INCULPATION

1191

Therefore, a killing that satisfies a justification defense would fail to satisfy
this offense element.26 3 In such jurisdictions, and with respect to such
offenses, contrivers conditioning their intent on the justifiability and
lawfulness of their conduct negate the harm or evil the offenses seek to
prevent by negating an explicit element of the offenses.
Consequently, the objection fails for four reasons. First, that a lawful
killing can be a legally cognizable evil is implausible. Second, the Code's
Commentary clearly states that conditions pertaining to defenses do negate
the harm or evil an offense seeks to prevent. Third, scholars understand
justification defenses to pertain to the harm or evil an offense seeks to
prevent. Finally, some jurisdictions explicitly include the absence of
justification as an offense element. As such, conditioning intent on the
presence of justification clearly negates the harm or evil of an offense by
negating an explicit element of the offense itself.

aforethought is murder." (emphasis added)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-50 (2017) ("[M]anslaughter,
or the unlawful killing of another .... (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-201 (2017)
("Criminal homicide is the unlawful killing of another person, which may be first degree murder,
second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or vehicular
homicide." (emphasis added)).
263. In addition, there are two further responses to the objection. First, the Model Penal Code
itself defines the absence of justification to be an "' element of an offense."' MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.13(9)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). As a result, the presence of justification negates the harm or
evil that an offense (including the element of the absence of justification) seeks to prevent.
Moreover, the Code defines "material element of an offense" as any element relating to "(i) the
harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the
existence of a justification ....
" Id. § 1.13(10). Second, the objection relies on a distinction
between elements of offenses and defenses for which there is no clearly persuasive rationale.
Whether a defense is treated exclusively as a defense or as a negative element of an offense is
widely viewed as arbitrary. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12, cmt. 4, at 196 (AM. LAW INST.,
Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) ("There is admittedly no certain principle by which to
gauge when a qualification of the scope of a prohibition should be viewed as a matter of excuse
or justification as distinguished from an aspect of the basic definition of the crime."); DOUGLAS
HUSAK, Willful Ignorance,Knowledge, and the 'Equal Culpability' Thesis: A Study of the Deeper
Significance of the Principle of Legality, in PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 200, 209 (1987)
(noting that most theorists find satisfactorily accounting for the distinction to be an
"impossibility"); MOORE, supra note 83, at 178 79 (opining that the distinction "makes no sense
to me"); Paul Robinson, Rules of Conductand PrinciplesofA djudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 729,
757 n.65 (1990) ("Defenses, even general defenses of justification and excuse, similarly might be
defined as negative elements of offenses. Given its manipulable nature, some additional
refinement is needed before we can assume that the conceptual structure of the criminal law ought
to revolve around the inculpation-exculpation distinction ....
").
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CONCLUSION

Defendants who contrive, create, or cause the conditions of their defense
and condition committing offenses on the applicability of such defenses pose
a thorny dilemma for the criminal law. Our formal intuition suggests that
defendants satisfying the legal requirements of a defense should receive it.
But our deeper intuition suggests that only defendants with "clean hands"
should succeed in avoiding criminal liability through a defense. By culpably
contriving a defense, the contriver has "unclean hands." The predominant
resolution of the dilemma in the criminal law is simple: bar the contrived
defense and hold the contriver liable (the Legal approach). Most criminal
theorists argue that the preferable approach is to both grant the contrived
defense and impose criminal liability for the culpable contriving of it (the
Theoretical approach). Despite seemingly paradoxically granting a defense
to, and imposing criminal liability for, one and the same offense, the
Theoretical approach enjoys some advantages. It ingeniously captures our
conflicting intuitions-contrived defenses both exculpate and inculpateand more clearly allocates the rights of third parties to aid or hinder the
contriver's conduct. But these advantages are for naught because the
Theoretical approach simply does not work. Either because of the conditional
nature of contrivers' plans or through application of the doctrine of
conditional intent, it fails to hold defense-contrivers criminally liable in three
broad categories: first, contrivers of justification defenses charged with
offenses requiring the mens rea of purpose, intention, or knowledge; second,
such contrivers charged with attempted offenses; and third, contrivers of
excuse defenses charged with offenses requiring the mens rea of knowledge.
In contrast, the Legal approach does work. It does not succumb to any of
these failures. To hold defense-contrivers criminally liable, the Legal
approach's simple method of barring the defense is preferable.

